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INTRODUCTION1 
 In 2017, along with her stillborn fetus, Latice Fisher, a Black 
woman, arrived at the Oktibbeha County General Hospital in 
Starkville, Mississippi2 in an ambulance.3  While receiving care from 
* Cynthia Conti-Cook is a civil rights attorney and researcher based in New York City
studying how technology impacts various fights for justice.  She is currently on
sabbatical from The Legal Aid Society’s Special Litigation Unit, working as a
Technology Fellow at the Ford Foundation. She is grateful to the Univ. of Baltimore
Law Review and the Applied Feminism and Privacy Conference of 2020, Michele
Gilman, and Margaret Johnson, for inviting her to publish this Article.  She is also
appreciative of the patient and diligent student editors working through challenging
circumstances.  As always, this Article has evolved through dialogue with many of
my colleagues, friends, and family.  Cynthia extends her appreciation for reviewing
drafts, sharing edits, and extensive brainstorming to Tanya Coke, Brook Kelly-Green
(who also initially drafted Parts I and Part IIA), Lynn Paltrow, Logan Koepke, Jerome
Greco, Rashida Richardson, Sara Ainsworth, Indra Lusero, and Terri Rosenblatt.  The
views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect
and are not attributable in any way to those of the Ford Foundation.
1. In 2005, filmmaker Penny Lane released The Abortion Diaries (2005) to “dispel[] the
stigma of abortion” by inviting 12 women to speak candidly about their abortion
experiences.  Penny Lane, The Abortion Diaries (2005), PENNY LANE, http://pennyla
neismyrealname.com/film/the-abortion-diaries-2005/ [https://perma.cc/FXH3-4U3S]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  In 2013, storyteller Melissa Madera founded The
Abortion Diary podcast to “speak out against the shame, stigma, secrecy, and
isolation surrounding abortion by generating, sharing, and receiving personal stories.”
Mission: The Abortion Diary, ABORTION DIARY, https://www.theabortiondiary
.com/mission [https://perma.cc/7DFX-RCMH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  Both
pieces begin with the same fundamental observation: because abortion is often
stigmatized, people who have experienced it tend to prefer it remain private and, if
choosing to share that experience, must feel safe and supported in doing so.  See id.
2. Nine history scholars from Mississippi University’s Department of History created “A
Shaky Truce” a website that “highlights the civil rights struggles that took place in
Starkville, Mississippi during the 1960s and 70s, a time when local African
Americans demanded equality for all citizens.”  The Project, STARKVILLE C.R.,
https://starkvillecivilrights.msstate.edu/wordpress/the-project/ [https://perma.cc/PX3Y
-3K7N] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  It describes Oktibbeha County as having “a
majority African American population in 1840 and continued to have one until 1950.”
The Place, STARKSVILLE C.R., https://starkvillecivilrights.msstate.edu/wordpress/the-
place/ [https://perma.cc/ZM7D-GW4C] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).  The county’s
Black population decreased to 34.6% in 2013 and its residents remain racially
segregated.  See id.
3. Ryan Phillips, Infant Death Case Heading Back to Grand Jury, STARKVILLE DAILY 
NEWS (May 8, 2019), https://www.starkvilledailynews.com/infant-death-case-heading
-back-to-grand-jury/article_cf99bcb0-71cc-11e9-963a-eb5dc5052c92.html [https://per
ma.cc/9H7B-CA8X] (“Fisher then walked out to the ambulance, was placed on a
stretcher, and transported to OCH Regional Medical Center in Starkville where she
was evaluated and questioned by hospital staff. Prosecutors allege that Fisher
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medical staff, she was also immediately treated with suspicion of 
committing a crime.4  Her statements to nurses, the medical records, 
and the autopsy records of her fetus were turned over to the local 
police to investigate whether she intentionally killed her fetus.5  To 
develop these records into evidence supporting an indictment for 
intentional murder, prosecutors would need some evidence about Ms. 
Fisher’s intent.6  This is typical; at best, prosecutions of people based 
on their pregnancy outcomes usually rely on circumstantial medical 
evidence, what patients report to nurses and doctors, and cooperation 
from medical staff.7  Without a confession, a diary, or something 
similar, direct evidence of a person’s mindset or intentions prior to a 
termination is usually absent.8  The lack of “intent” evidence might 
not discourage a prosecutor from attempting to indict someone, but it 
might dissuade a grand jury from voting for an indictment.9  In Ms. 
Fisher’s case, the prosecutor sought to fill that gap in the initial 
presentation to the Grand Jury by arguing that Ms. Fisher’s web 
search history proved her criminal intent; it included searches for 
how to induce a miscarriage and evidence that she purchased 
misoprostol online.10  The first Grand Jury was convinced and 
indicted Ms. Fisher for second degree murder.11  
admitted to a nurse that she learned she was pregnant during an annual gynecological 
exam a month earlier, but she failed to make any follow-up appointments for an 
ultrasound or other prenatal care. . . . Fisher was interviewed by investigators about 
how the events occurred and court documents say she admitted that she didn’t want 
any more children, that she couldn’t afford any more and that she ‘simply couldn’t 
deal with being pregnant again.’ Investigators also learned that on April 17, 2017, 
which was far into Fisher’s third trimester, she researched medication abortion. This 
information came after investigators downloaded Latice Fisher’s cell phone memory 
and data, which revealed her internet search history. She also admitted to conducting 
internet searches, including how to induce a miscarriage, ‘buy abortion pills, 
mifeprisone online, misoprostol online,’ and ‘buy Misoprostol abortion pill online.’ 
Fisher then purchased misoprostol following the online search, according to the 
district attorney’s office.”). 
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Rodgers v. State, 166 So. 3d 537, 547 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
7. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., id (detailing prosecutorial reliance on search history and statements to
medical professionals).
9. See, e.g., id.
10. Id.  Some of the searches Ms. Fisher entered were as follows: “‘buy abortion pills,
mifeprisone online, misoprostol online,’ and ‘buy Misoprostol abortion pill online.’”
Id.
11. Id.  Ms. Fisher’s first indictment was voluntarily dismissed by the prosecutor after her
defense team—the National Advocates for Pregnant Women and local counsel
Williams Starks—presented the District Attorney with expert opinions which cast a
2020] Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary 5 
This Article presents a sobering forecast; the inclusion of Ms. 
Fisher’s alleged internet search history related to her reproductive 
health as evidence of criminal intent will become standard protocol 
across the country once abortion is again criminalized.12  Restricted 
access to abortion clinics13 and an increasing number of Americans 
turning to the internet for medical advice14 are both contributing to 
doubt on the conclusions reached by the state medical examiner; even still, the 
District Attorney again presented the case against Ms. Fisher unsuccessfully in March 
2020.  Lauren Rankin, How an Online Search for Abortion Pills Landed This Woman 
in Jail, FAST CO. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90468030/how-an-
online-search-for-abortion-pills-landed-this-woman-in-jail [https://perma.cc/R6EL-W 
FA6]; see also A No Bill, Mississippi v. Fisher Grand Jury No. 165 (Mar. 6, 2020) 
(on file with the author) (grand jury document filed in The Circuit Court of Oktibbeha 
County, Mississippi). 
12. See infra Part III.
13. RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., ABORTION INCIDENCE AND SERVICE AVAILABILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2017 1 (Guttmacher Inst., 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/abortion-incidence-service-availability-us-2017.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/3T9A-76WJ] (“[R]egional and state disparities in clinic availability grew more
pronounced; the number of clinics increased in the Northeast and the West, by 16%
and 4% respectively, and decreased in the Midwest and the South, by 6% and 9%,
respectively.”); Elizabeth Nash et al., State Policy Trends 2019: A Wave of Abortion
Bans, but Some States Are Fighting Back, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-2019-wave-abortion-
bans-some-states-are-fighting-back# [https://perma.cc/U2V8-52YU] (“In 2019,
conservative state legislators raced to enact an unprecedented wave of bans on all,
most or some abortions, and by the end of the year, 25 new abortion bans had been
signed into law, primarily in the South and Midwest.  Along with this new strategy,
legislators also continued their efforts to adopt other types of abortion restrictions,
including requirements for abortion providers to give patients misleading and
inaccurate information about the potential to reverse a medication abortion as part of
abortion counseling.”); Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six
Weeks, Before Most People Know They Are Pregnant, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/03/surge-bans-abortion-early-six-weeks-
most-people-know-they-are-pregnant [https://perma.cc/8JRP-HENW] (May 30, 2019)
(“On May 30, Louisiana became the fifth state this year to enact a ban at six weeks of
gestation, before many people even know that they are pregnant. The other four states
where six-week bans have been signed into law in 2019 are Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky
and Mississippi. In addition, Alabama enacted a near-total abortion ban, while
Missouri enacted a ban at eight weeks of gestation. None of these laws are currently
in effect.”).
14. See Pete Roseler, New Research Shows Why Doctors Need a Strong Online Presence,
INC. (May 21, 2018), https://www.inc.com/peter-roesler/new-research-shows-why-
doctors-need-a-strong-online-presence.html [https://perma.cc/Y4UV-SBEX] (“A
survey of more than 1,700 U.S. adults found the four out of five (80 percent)
respondents have used the internet to make a healthcare-related search in the past
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how pregnant people increasingly identify their options with respect 
to their reproductive health online, creating a trail of digital 
evidence.15  These digital trails are already being introduced as 
evidence against them in criminal cases for intentionally terminating 
their pregnancies.16  If the United States Supreme Court votes to 
overturn Roe v. Wade and a number of state legislatures vote to 
criminalize abortion, investigations and prosecutions of pregnancy 
outcomes will increasingly rely on these unprotected digital trails.17 
In addition to facilitating prosecutions of pregnant people for 
intentionally terminating their pregnancies, technology will also 
enhance the government’s ability to surveille, investigate, and 
prosecute pregnant people who did not seek to terminate but whom 
the state seeks control over by virtue of their pregnancy status.18  For 
example, pregnant people’s decisions—to self-medicate, to not 
medicate, to seek substance abuse treatment, to drink alcohol,  or 
smoke cigarettes—are all decisions that could be criminalized and 
potentially surveilled digitally.19  A wide variety of digital forensic 
year. . . . [and] three in five (63 percent) of all the respondents will choose one 
provider over another because of a strong online presence.”). 
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.  This Article does not argue or consider the status of self-induced
abortions as a fundamental right.  While it has been argued to the contrary, that
argument is worth revisiting given new abortion pill technology.  See Suzanne M.
Alford, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, Note, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1021
(2003); see also Becky Little, The Science Behind the “Abortion Pill”, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (June 23, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/health-medicine/science-
behind-abortion-pill-180963762/ [https://perma.cc/Q8PJ-WLLA].  Marissa Kreutzfeld
doesn’t address this in her argument, instead saying that the environment of restricted
access alone should change Alford’s type of analysis.  Marissa Kreutzfeld, An Unduly
Burdensome Reality: The Unconstitutionality of State Feticide Laws That Criminalize
Self-Induced Abortion in the Age of Extreme Abortion Restrictions, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 55, 104 (2016); Andrea Rowan, Prosecuting Women for Self-Inducing
Abortion: Counterproductive and Lacking Compassion, 18 GUTTMACHER POL’Y. REV.
70, 70–71 (2015).
17. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
18. Kira Proehl, Pregnancy Crimes: New Worries to Expect When You're Expecting, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661, 681 (2013) (“Virtually every action a pregnant woman
takes can have an impact on her fetus. If states choose to hold women criminally
liable for the outcomes of their pregnancies, where should society draw the line
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior? The difficulty underlying this
determination has historically led courts to be reluctant to prosecute women for harm
to their fetuses resulting from certain acts or omissions. If states are serious about
prosecuting pregnancy crimes, how should the law define ‘good’ versus ‘bad’
maternal behavior?”).
19. AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMINALIZING PREGNANCY: POLICING PREGNANT WOMEN WHO USE
DRUGS IN THE USA 20 (2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5
2020] Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary 7 
technology and other forms of technology broaden state surveillance 
power through online searches, geofencing,20 location tracking, 
purchasing history, and more.21  Combined, these data points could 
identify, for example, the profiles of pregnant people spending time 
at substance abuse treatment centers, making purchases at bars, or 
repeatedly taking a particular route across state lines.22  Digital 
surveillance through location-tracking data embedded on 
smartphones and various applications (apps) was widely introduced 
during the outbreak of the COVID pandemic to enforce social 
distancing orders, trace contact with people who were presumed to 
have COVID, and investigate quarantine violations.23  Any number 
162032017ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZB3-GWY3] (“Some localities have 
chosen to pursue certain conduct more aggressively than others, for example, deciding 
to remove children solely based on marijuana use, while others do not pursue or 
ignore these cases altogether. In most states, a CPS worker may use a single positive 
drug test to make a claim of abuse even without an assessment of the family’s ability 
to care for a child. Even in states without such laws defining drug exposure during 
pregnancy as child abuse, CPS can monitor pregnant women and intervene as soon as 
a child is born.”) (footnotes omitted); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of 
and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: 
Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y 
& L., 299, 314 (2013) (“Declining a ‘biophysical profile’ at a prenatal care 
appointment a week earlier, as well as drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes while 
pregnant, all legal activities, were mentioned in the criminal complaint describing the 
grounds for her arrest on charges of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and 
first-degree reckless injury.”). 
20. Proximi.io, What are Geofences? - All About Geofencing in 5 Min, YOUTUBE (Feb.
26, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oklOTx_jnbA; Sarah K. White, What
is Geofencing? Putting Location to Work, CIO (Nov. 1, 2017, 12:43 PM),
https://www.cio.com/article/2383123/geofencing-explained.html [https://perma.cc/Y8
EN-TNHY] (“Geofencing is a service that triggers an action when a device enters a
set location.”).
21. See Paige M. Boshell, The Power of Place: Geolocation Tracking and Privacy,
A.B.A.: BUS. L. TODAY (Mar. 25, 2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/03/power-
place-geolocation-tracking-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/FJF4-L8LK].
22. Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. That Has to
End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-lo
cation-data-without-warrant-end/ [https://perma.cc/BU3F-WL6V] (“Your cell phone
records every location you visit if the phone’s location services are turned on, which
is more often than not. Called cell-site location information, this data is tracked on
both Android devices and iPhones. The information can be quite telling; it might
show the location of your home, your office, and other places you visit often. The
problem is that it can teach police about a person's behavior and then can be used
against them.”).
23. Yingzhi Yang & Julie Zhu, Coronavirus Brings China’s Surveillance State Out of the
Shadows, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2020, 7:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china
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of “bad behaviors” by pregnant people could similarly be surveilled 
with a range of available technology.24  Depending on the 
inclinations of the prosecutor and the laws in each state, people could 
potentially be criminalized for being pregnant and doing or refusing 
to do something that is perceived as creating a risk of harm to 
fetuses.25  Indeed, many prosecutors have already charged people for 
conduct that would be legal but for their pregnancy.26  How 
-health-surveillance-idUSKBN2011HO [https://perma.cc/4EZY-WFSY] (“Artificial
intelligence and security camera companies boast that their systems can scan the
streets for people with even low-grade fevers, recognize their faces even if they are
wearing masks and report them to the authorities. If a coronavirus patient boards a
train, the railway’s ‘real name’ system can provide a list of people sitting nearby.
Mobile phone apps can tell users if they have been on a flight or a train with a known
coronavirus carrier, and maps can show them locations of buildings where infected
patients live.”); Mark Gurman, Apple, Google Bring Covid-19 Contact-Tracing to 3
Billion People, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-04-10/apple-google-bring-covid-19-contact-tracing-to-3-billion-
people [https://perma.cc/P2ZN-RKNH] (“Apple Inc. and Google unveiled a rare
partnership to add technology to their smartphone platforms that will alert users if
they have come into contact with a person with Covid-19. People must opt in to the
system, but it has the potential to monitor about a third of the world’s population.”);
Byron Tau, Government Tracking How People Move Around in Coronavirus
Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/government-
tracking-how-people-move-around-in-coronavirus-pandemic-11585393202 [https://
perma.cc/C994-YUFP] (“The federal government, through the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and state and local governments have started to receive
analyses about the presence and movement of people in certain areas of geographic
interest drawn from cellphone data. . . .”).
24. Proehl, supra note 18, at 682 (“Where states are choosing to draw the line between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior appears to be rather arbitrary. If states are truly worried
about what pregnant women are doing to affect fetal health, should not women be
prevented from participating in any activity that is known to have a negative impact?
In What to Expect When You’re Expecting, the authors warn women to avoid
activities like changing a cat’s litter box, eating unpasteurized cheese, sushi or deli
meats, gardening without gloves, handling household cleaning products, and drinking
coffee—all of which can impact a fetus. Under South Carolina law, a woman is guilty
of homicide by child abuse if she causes death ‘while committing child abuse or
neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life.’ If a woman knows that garden chemicals are bad for her
developing fetus, yet decides to work in a garden without wearing appropriate gloves,
this could easily be seen as a ‘conscious failure to exercise due care’ regarding the
safety of her fetus. Under existing law, she could be found criminally liable for her
actions if something during her pregnancy brings her case to the attention of state
prosecutors.”) (footnotes omitted).
25. Id.
26. AMNESTY INT’L, supra  note 19, at 20; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 19, at 314
(“Declining a ‘biophysical profile’ at a prenatal care appointment a week earlier, as
well as drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes while pregnant, all legal activities,
2020] Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary 9 
technology will enhance the potential for criminalizing “bad 
behaviors” unrelated to abortion—i.e., changing a cat’s litter box, 
eating unpasteurized cheese, sushi or deli meats, gardening without 
gloves, handling household cleaning products, and drinking 
coffee27—deserves future in-depth treatment, but is not the focus of 
this Article, which solely examines the role of technology in 
emboldening those who wish to criminalize the pregnant person for 
specific pregnancy outcomes.28 
When pregnant people are criminalized—whether for decisions to 
terminate, for being pregnant and engaging in a specific behavior, or 
experiencing a condition thought to pose some risk to the 
pregnancy—the consequences touch all aspects of their lives, while 
impacting their families and communities.29  In addition to facing 
time-consuming and expensive consequences (e.g., criminal 
conviction, owing fines and fees, potentially serving jail time, being 
subject to mandated programs, or required meetings with 
caseworkers) people who have been criminalized pay in many other 
ways for their convictions.30  Pregnant people may lose custody over 
other family members because of a prosecution, lose work, medical 
care, careers, educational opportunities, stable housing, vehicles, 
confiscated digital devices, and many other survival tools as a result 
of a prosecution.31  Digital tools—like those for risk assessments 
used in child welfare systems, social welfare programs, public 
were mentioned in the criminal complaint describing the grounds for her arrest on 
charges of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless 
injury.”). 
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28. See generally infra Part III.
29. Torrey McConnell, Comment, The War on Women: The Collateral Consequences of
Female Incarceration, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 493, 501 (2017) (“Because of the
failure to recognize these systemic barriers, many women will be released from prison
with collateral consequences that will last long beyond the completion of their
sentence.”).  The collateral consequences include: (1) lack of appropriate treatment
for mental illness and addiction; (2) lack of access to state welfare and benefits; (3)
maternal incarceration and intergenerational criminality; and (4) termination of
parental rights.  Id. at 501, 504, 508, 511.
30. See id. at 501–13.
31. See, e.g., id. at 509; Nicholas Freudenberg, Adverse Effects of US Jail and Prison
Policies on the Health and Well-Being of Women of Color, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1895, 1895 (2002); Christie Thompson, For Tarra Simmons, Her Time in Prison Isn’t




10 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
substance abuse programs, as well as police, correctional, educational 
or juvenile systems—all interact with people who have prior 
convictions to make surveillance on supervision more scrutinizing 
and omnipresent, and to make access to resources more restrictive.32  
If more pregnant people are prosecuted in relation to the termination 
of pregnancies, their marginalization will deepen.33  This topic also 
deserves further investigation as the impact of digital, biometric, and 
genetic surveillance accumulates to increasingly “microtarget” 
historically oppressed communities.34 
This Article also examines how digital trails will lead to 
investigations and prosecutions of medical providers and those who 
assist with abortions.35  Imagine what Jane—the underground 
abortion network that grew out of Chicago in the pre-Roe late 
sixties—would look like today if abortions were criminalized.36  
Instead of hanging flyers on campuses and putting advertisements in 
newspapers that read “Pregnant? Don’t want to be? Call Jane,”37 in 
today’s world, there may be Instagram accounts, websites, email 
addresses, and a Facebook group where members connect instead of 
meeting in person.38  These communication technologies have greatly 
32. See generally Dan Hurley, Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algori
thm-tell-when-kids-are-in-danger.html [https://perma.cc/PMT2-CGW3] (discussing
the strengths and weaknesses of a novel predictive analytical algorithm used by police
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania since 2016 to predict when children collateral to
criminal activity are at risk of abuse or neglect).
33. Rowan, supra note 16, at 70.
34. Dipayan Ghosh, What Is Microtargeting and What Is It Doing in Our Politics?,
MOZILLA: INTERNET CITIZEN (October 4, 2018), https://blog.mozilla.org/inter
netcitizen/2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayan-ghosh/ [https://perma.cc/752U-FRE3]
(“Microtargeting is a marketing strategy that uses people’s data — about what they
like, who they’re connected to, what their demographics are, what they’ve purchased,
and more — to segment them into small groups for content targeting.”).
35. See infra Section III.B.
36. Clyde Haberman, Code Name Jane: The Women Behind a Covert Abortion Network,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/illegal-abortion-
janes.html [https://perma.cc/L6JN-BT4Z] (“The Janes’ tactics were worthy of a spy
novel. A woman seeking to end her pregnancy left a message on an answering
machine. A ‘Callback Jane’ phoned her, collected information and passed it to a ‘Big
Jane.’ Patients would be taken first to one address, ‘the front,’ for counseling. They
were then led, sometimes blindfolded, to another spot, ‘the place,’ where a doctor did
the abortion.”).
37. Id. (“The no-frills advertisement, printed at times in student and alternative
newspapers, went straight to the point: ‘Pregnant? Don't want to be? Call Jane.’ A
telephone number followed.”).
38. See, e.g., Lizzie Presser, Whatever's Your Darkest Question, You Can Ask Me, CAL. 
SUNDAY MAG. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://story.californiasunday.com/abortion-providers
2020] Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary 11 
improved access to reproductive health options and providers, but 
they are tools that also leave digital trails—not just to the individuals 
that use them, but also to the entire network with whom an individual 
interacts on a digital device.39  While the analog era did not protect 
Jane members from eventual arrest, it did allow them to operate 
undetected for several years.40  To imagine how Jane may survive in 
the digital era, this Article includes anatomies of various digital 
investigations of internet-dependent networks to extract lessons about 
how similar techniques may be used against online abortion pill 
providers, both medical and non-medical.41 
This Article hopes to introduce some common vocabulary between 
communities that may not normally intersect.42  While many terms 
will be defined throughout the Article, there are a few key concepts 
worth defining upfront. “Criminalization” is used throughout the 
Article to describe the process through which multiple legal, 
political, and social maneuvers—including some that are assisted by 
technology—are leveraged to punish people.43  To the extent 
technology is described as criminalizing, playing a role in 
[https://perma.cc/RX6A-MU4Q] (“Anna started posting on Facebook about abortion, 
looking for direction. Eventually, a friend reached out to her, offering to introduce her 
to a woman named Natalie. . . . After several calls, Natalie told Anna about a side of 
her life she hadn't yet shared: She was helping with a workshop on how to provide 
home abortions.”). 
39. See infra Section III.A.2.
40. Haberman, supra note 36 (“The network came into being in 1969. . . . In 1972, the
Chicago police raided an apartment used by the Janes, and arrested seven of them.”).
41. See infra Sections III.A.5, III.B.
42. See supra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
43. Interrupting Criminalization: Research in Action, BARNARD CTR. FOR RES. ON 
WOMEN, http://bcrw.barnard.edu/fellows/interrupting-criminalization-research-in-acti
on/ [https://perma.cc/G6B9-EE5W] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“Criminalization is
the social and political process by which society determines which and whose actions
or behaviors will be punished by the state. At the most basic level, criminalization
involves the passage and enforcement of criminal laws. While framed as neutral,
decisions about what kinds of conduct to punish, how, and how much are very much a
choice, guided by existing structures of economic and social inequality based on race,
gender, sexuality, disability, and poverty, among others. The practice of
criminalization extends beyond laws and policies to more symbolic and entrenched
processes by which people are deemed categorically ‘criminal.’ This process is fueled
by widespread and commonly accepted stereotypes, which are highly racialized and
gendered¾whether they are about ‘thugs,’ ‘crack mothers,’ ‘welfare queens,’ or ‘bad
hombres.’ These narratives create generalized states of anxiety and fear, and brand
people labeled ‘criminal’ as threatening, dangerous, and inhuman. In this context,
restrictions on freedom, expression, movement, and survival, as well as violence,
denial of protection, banishment, and exile are the inevitable and natural responses.”).
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criminalizing individuals, or having the effect of criminalizing more 
pregnant people, it is not meant to be identified as the motivating 
factor, nor is this argument suggesting technology should not be an 
important tool in helping people access information about abortions, 
or directly accessing medication abortions.44  The technology at issue 
here—digital forensic tools and surveillance technology—is neutral 
to the type of offense it is deployed for; it does not have 
programming constraints that would only allow it to detect internet 
searches that only suggest, for example, homicidal intent.45  The 
underlying assumption upon which all these tools were constructed is 
that the crimes the state is emboldened to prosecute are clearly 
criminal conduct, as opposed to conduct that some consider criminal 
and some consider associated with a fundamental right.46 
While some have argued that self-induced abortion is not a 
fundamental right, presuming it to include a wide spectrum of 
procedures akin to self-harm (e.g., throwing oneself down the stairs, 
coat hanger abortions, ingesting poisons),47 I adopt the definition of 
legal advocacy organization If/When/How: “[a self-induced abortion 
is] [a]n abortion that occurs most commonly in someone’s home, 
done in privacy and in safety, sometimes with the help of a caregiver, 
friend, or family member. It may include the use of pharmaceutical 
pills, traditional herbs, or other means to end a pregnancy.”48  Rather 
than presuming self-induced abortions are unsafe, I make the 
assumption throughout this Article, based on numerous studies, that 
they are generally safe procedures that can be managed at home.49 
44. See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
45. See generally Patrick Toomy, The NSA Continues to Violate Americans' Internet
Privacy Rights, ACLU (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/privacy-and-surveillance/nsa-continues-violate-americans-internet-privacy
[https://perma.cc/239G-5SQS].
46. See infra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
47. Alford, supra note 16, at 1013, 1015.
48. Compare The SIA Legal Team, Roe's Unfinished Promise, IF/WHEN/HOW (2018),
https://www.ifwhenhow.org/download/?key=XpBzIyAguykWnk32raFjX28RDycRiC
HNDUx5tWmkJe2zr1tdJB8WitpkmyzyMMdn [https://perma.cc/VJT4-VVCC], with
Alford, supra note 16, at 1012–13.
49. Abigail Aiken et al., Self-Reported Outcomes and Adverse Events After Medical
Abortion Through Online Telemedicine: Population Based Study in the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland, 357 BMJ 1, 1 (May 2017) (finding that “[s]elf sourced
medical abortion using online telemedicine can be highly effective, and outcomes
compare favourably with in clinic protocols.”); Julia Belluz, Abortions by Mail Are
Available Now in the US. Here’s What You Need to Know, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/10/20/17999996/abortion-mail-online-
mifepristone-misoprostol [https://perma.cc/JU86-WWB8] (Oct. 22, 2018, 8:15 AM);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 46 (2017),
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Digital data (and digital evidence) is also mentioned frequently 
throughout the Article to reference “information and data of value to 
an investigation that is stored on, received, or transmitted by an 
electronic device.”50  It can include online browsing history, 
unencrypted communications, location history, purchasing history, 
social media activity, and health data generated by apps or added 
manually, for example, menstrual cycle trackers (tracking a wide 
variety of data, which includes moods, appetite assessments, physical 
symptoms, and sexual intercourse).51  All these systems generate 
digital trails that could potentially be used as evidence against 
pregnant people and providers in prosecutions related to the 
terminations of their pregnancies.52 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I grounds us in the long 
history of criminalization of specific pregnancy outcomes motivated 
by racism, misogyny, and maintenance of patriarchal power 
structures, expressed through various legal, medical, and moral 
distinctions regarding when a decision to terminate is criminal, and 
the sociocultural motivations behind criminalization.53  Part I is 
intended to remind us that the conflict presented here is ancient and 
the corresponding solutions must match its complexity; enacting laws 
that respect digital rights or setting guardrails around what health-
related information can be gleaned from our digital devices and used 
against us in criminal court is a starting point, not a conclusive 
victory.54  Part II gives this problem urgency; the combination of 
restricted access to abortion clinics and the looming threat of the 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273826/EML-20-eng.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/Y4HU-28RA]; Beverly Winikoff et al., Safety, Efficacy, and Acceptability of 
Medical Abortion in China, Cuba, and India: A Comparative Trial of Mifepristone-
Misoprostol Versus Surgical Abortion, 176 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 431, 
431 (1997) (“The medical regimen had more side effects, particularly bleeding, than 
did surgical abortion but very few serious side effects. Failure rates for medical 
abortion, although low, exceeded those for surgical abortion: 8.6% versus 0.4% 
(China), 16.0% versus 4.0% (Cuba), and 5.2% versus 0% (India). Nearly half of 
failures among medical clients were not true drug failures, however, but surgical 
interventions not medically necessary (acceptability failures or misdiagnoses). 
Women were satisfied with either method, but more preferred medical abortion.”). 
50. SEAN E. GOODISON ET AL., DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3 (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR8
00/RR890/RAND_RR890.pdf [https://perma.cc/296H-939R].
51. See infra Section III.A.6.
52. See infra Section III.B.
53. See infra Part I.
54. See infra Part I.
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United States Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade will result in 
more people relying on the internet for information related to 
abortion, and more people being investigated and prosecuted for 
conduct related to terminating their pregnancy.55 
 Part III introduces the role of technology in this emergent future.56  
It walks through the increasingly intense amount of private, 
medically-related information we are all sharing with our digital 
devices, and focuses on how this is amplified for pregnant people.57  
Part III then walks through digital forensic techniques currently used 
by police and prosecutors, along with two case studies of women 
who have been prosecuted with digital evidence extracted from their 
devices,58 and two case studies of providers whose distribution of 
online abortion pills have resulted in a federal investigation and 
federal prosecution.59  In addition to online search histories, Part III 
explores multiple types of digital evidence that can also be culled to 
support a prosecution, including location tracking data, website 
navigation history, purchasing history, social media activity, 
wearable device data, data entered into apps (e.g., menstrual cycle 
tracking apps), and home devices connected to the internet (e.g., 
Alexa, Amazon Ring, smart refrigerators, and other “smart” devices 
for homes).60 
Finally, Part IV introduces various social justice movements aimed 
at protecting us from government collection and deployment of our 
data against us, reviews litigation strategies, legislative campaigns, 
and “digital hygiene” practices we should all share to protect 
ourselves and our movement networks in the face of increasing 
corporate and governmental data surveillance.61 
The goal of this paper is to build increased awareness and common 
goals across multiple movements, help identify and mitigate risks 
related to relying on digital devices for information about 
reproductive health, to introduce new versions of old arguments to 
protect people from having their digital devices used against them in 
criminal court, to introduce defenders and technologists to 
55. See infra Part II.
56. See infra Section III.A.
57. See infra Section III.A.
58. See infra Section III.B.
59. See infra Section III.B.1.
60. See infra Section III.B.2.
61. See infra Part IV; NACDLvideo, Digital Hygiene for Defense Lawyers: A Digital
Security Checklist [webinar], YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=AMGKW66Hp8Y.
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reproductive justice framing, and to flag the real threats that poor and 
low-income pregnant people of color already experience. 
My hope is for this Article to help build conversations connecting 
digital privacy, reproductive justice, decriminalization, and anti-
surveillance movements, as well as informing criminal defense 
practitioners about how to best protect a pregnant person’s right to 
self-induce abortions and self-determine their reproductive decisions 
with any and all tools that support them, including their digital 
devices.  
I. HISTORY OF CRIMINALIZATION OF PREGNANT
PEOPLE AND PROVIDERS62
For much of history, abortion services were the realm of 
midwives—women providing services to other women through social 
networks—by passing along folk knowledge or providing herbal 
remedies that would induce termination of a pregnancy.63  Public 
advertisements for tonics promoted relief from “obstruction of 
menstruation,” as did “Female Renovating Pills.”64  The need to end 
a pregnancy was generally understood during a time when pregnancy 
and birth were considered life threatening, and social consequences 
for unwed mothers were severe.65  It was not until the seventeenth 
century that the first attempt to criminalize self-induced abortion was 
documented.66  From that point, religious and secular law evolved 
both in England and America regarding whether a third-party or 
pregnant person could be criminalized for ending a pregnancy.67  
62. The first draft of Part I and Part II.A. were originally drafted by Brook Kelly-Green,
who granted the author permission to use them.
63. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A 
HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 85 (2d ed. 2010) ("In 1910, about 50 percent of all
babies were delivered by midwives—most were blacks or working class
immigrants.”); id. at 41 (“As for female sexuality, witches were accused, in effect, of
giving contraceptive aid and of performing abortions.”).
64. CARROL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN
VICTORIAN AMERICA 219 (1985); JANET FARREL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND 
ABORTION IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 254 (1997).
65. See Geoffrey Chamberlain, British Maternal Mortality in the 19th and Early 20th
Centuries, 99 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 559, 559 (2006).
66. See Alford, supra note 16, at 1019; Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion
Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1785 (1991).
67. See Alford, supra note 16, at 1020 (“English common law also addressed the issue of
whether a woman could be held criminally liable for self-aborting after quickening.
Although it has been contended that the common law did not permit punishment of
women who self-aborted or submitted to abortion, there is case law to the contrary. In
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With the formalization and professionalization of medicine, and the 
establishment of the American Medical Association in the mid-to-late 
1800s, doctors maneuvered to monopolize abortion and obstetrics, 
lobbying to remove midwives from the practice of reproductive 
health and abortion through licensing regimes.68  This was during a 
period marked by growing social conservatism, fears of slowing birth 
rates among white Americans, and reinforcement of traditional 
gender roles of women as wife and mother and man as husband and 
provider.69  The Comstock Laws of 1873 banned the publication and 
dissemination of information about contraception.70  By the end of 
the 19th century, every state except Kentucky had laws banning 
abortion, with Connecticut passing the first state law to criminalize 
abortion in 1821 and New York following suit in 1845.71  Over the 
period leading up to the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, low-income 
women were least able to access abortion procedures, while middle 
to upper class women typically accessed abortion services through 
private family physicians or by traveling outside of the United States 
to obtain the procedure.72 
Through its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
guaranteed a constitutional privacy protection to pregnant people 
regarding their right to make the decision to have an abortion.73  In 
the 1602 case of Regina v. Webb, a woman was indicted for self-aborting through the 
use of poison. Although the defendant received a general pardon—it is unclear 
whether she was pardoned before or after conviction—this case illustrates that, from 
an early point in the development of British common law, a woman could be 
criminally prosecuted for self-aborting.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1014 (quoting 
State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 340–42 (Fla. 1997)). 
68. EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 63, at 61; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 300 (1992); see JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900 147 (1978).
69. See Siegel, supra note 68, at 327–28.
70. Id. at 314–15.
71. Alford, supra note 16, at 1021–22; Buell, supra note 66, at 1783–85.  Yet even then,
“the general consensus was that the woman herself was not a criminal.”  NAT’L INST. 
FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, WHEN SELF-ABORTION IS A CRIME: LAWS THAT PUT
WOMEN AT RISK 1 (2017) (footnotes omitted), https://www.nirhealth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Self-Abortion-White-Paper-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/79Y
N-RNFH].
72. All Things Considered, What Abortion Was Like in the U.S. Before Roe v. Wade, NPR 
(May 20, 2019, 5:26 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/20/725139713/what-
abortion-was-like-in-the-u-s-before-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/5TW7-JLW7]
(discussing the dangers women faced in receiving illegal abortions prior to the
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
73. See 410 U.S. at 153–54.
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the following few years, Congress passed the so-called Hyde 
Amendment to ban federal funding for abortion services, summarily 
creating an economic, and in many cases, a racial divide between 
women who can and cannot afford to access abortion.74  In addition, 
pregnant people have continued to be criminalized for a wide variety 
of conduct related to their bodies during their pregnancy, including 
drug use, refusal of medical treatments and interventions during 
pregnancy and birth, and decisions to intentionally terminate a 
pregnancy outside of a traditional medical setting.75  Most individuals 
targeted for criminalization are low-income women, women of color, 
immigrant women, and those at the intersections of these 
characteristics.76  This pattern demonstrates the persistence of 
misogyny and racism at play in legal systems that seek to regulate the 
decisions women make about their bodies.77 
II. CURRENT LANDSCAPE
A. Increased Restrictions of Access
Opponents of abortion did not give up in the wake of Roe.78  A
constant onslaught of unnecessary regulations to the procedure 
followed Roe and continue to this day.79  The United States Supreme 
Court upheld Planned Parenthood v. Casey80—the landmark 1992 
case creating the “undue burden” standard for state restrictions on 
abortion—as recently as 2016.81  Yet, its enforcement has been 
challenged by changes to the composition of the current Supreme 
74. See Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding
Restrictions Under Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 391–92 (2012).
75. See Andrew S. Murphy, A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Laws and Their Potential
Applicability to Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Own Fetuses, 89 IND. L.J. 847,
860 (2014); see Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 19, at 314, 317; Proehl, supra note 18,
at 668–69; see Lynn M. Paltrow, Roe v Wade and the New Jane Crow: Reproductive
Rights in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 17, 17–18 (2013).
76. See Soohoo, supra note 74, at 398.
77. See id.
78. See infra Part II.A.
79. See Soohoo, supra note 74, at 418–20; see also Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The
Legacy of Casey, 35 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 299, 302 (2014) (“More than 755
restrictions on abortion have been enacted since Casey issued in 1992. . . . Waiting
periods, mandated ultrasounds, prohibitions on late-term abortions, fetal pain and
personhood laws, and onerous informed consent requirements typically convey a
message of moral disapproval of abortion.”).
80. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
81. Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016).
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Court to a conservative and presumably anti-abortion majority.82  The 
2019 state legislative session included a wave of unprecedented 
abortion bans in twenty-two Midwestern and Southern states, 
including a handful that explicitly or effectively outlaw abortion in 
most circumstances and sought to criminalize pregnant people who 
seek abortions, abortion providers, and those that assist others in 
accessing abortion.83  For example, Louisiana persisted in fighting in 
federal courts to maintain a law almost identical to a law overturned 
in Whole Women’s Health, which required providers to have 
admitting privileges at local hospitals within  thirty  miles of their 
82. Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the Supreme Court
to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/amy-
barrett-views-issues.html [https://perma.cc/WZL8-KUV2] (“In a 2013 law review
article, [Justice Barrett] examined the role of the doctrine of stare decisis, which is
Latin for ‘to stand by things decided’ and is shorthand for respect for precedent. The
doctrine is, Judge Barrett wrote, ‘not a hard-and-fast rule in the court’s constitutional
cases,’ and she added that its power is diminished when the case under review is
unpopular. ‘The public response to controversial cases like Roe,’ she wrote, ‘reflects
public rejection of the proposition that stare decisis can declare a permanent victor in
a divisive constitutional struggle.’”); Alexander Bolton, Democrats Build Abortion
Case Against Kavanaugh, THE HILL (July 10, 2018, 1:22 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/396317-democrats-build-abortion-case-against-
kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/T4W7-NMYF] (“Senate Democrats are pointing to two
key decisions that Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh was involved in to argue
he would likely vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, the landmark case that established a
woman's right to an abortion.”).
83. See Sabrina Tavernise & Adeel Hassan, Missouri Lawmakers Pass Bill Criminalizing
Abortion at About 8 of Weeks Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/missouri-abortion-law.html [https://perma.c
c/VZ3U-26NG] (“Under the Missouri law, doctors who perform abortions would be
prosecuted and could be sentenced to prison for anywhere between five and 15 years.
Women who seek abortions will not be prosecuted.”); Amanda Klasing, Alabama's
Abortion Ban Is a Dark Day for Women, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 15, 2019, 1:45
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/15/alabamas-abortion-ban-dark-day-women
[https://perma.cc/2MN8-WWQX] (“Should that happen, women in Alabama could
face jail for having – or even trying to have – an abortion. And other states would
surely follow Alabama's lead – some already have similar laws on the books or being
considered.”); Dartunorro Clark, Anti-Abortion Bills Mount as GOP-Led States Angle
for Supreme Court Fight Over Roe v. Wade, NBC NEWS (May 12, 2019, 1:58 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/anti-abortion-bills-mount-gop-led-
states-angle-supreme-court-n1004366 [https://perma.cc/L4NS-76TE] (“The Georgia
bill, she said, signed into law by Republican Gov. Brian Kemp last week, essentially
grants personhood to a fetus and, under certain circumstances, could criminalize
women who have a miscarriage.”); Annalisa Merelli & Ana Campoy, These Are All
the States that Have Adopted Anti-Abortion Laws So Far in 2019, QUARTZ (May 30,
2019), https://qz.com/1627412/these-are-all-the-states-with-anti-abortion-laws-signed
-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/3LWV-F6QY]; Nash et al., supra note 13.
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abortion facility.84  In 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
the case of June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, which was argued 
before the Supreme Court in March 2020 and decided in June 2020.85  
Many experts feared that the Court would issue a decision that 
returns decision-making powers regarding the legality of certain 
abortion practices to state legislatures, thereby turning back the legal 
rights of pregnant people to pre-1973 regimes in several states that 
have already passed bans in anticipation of the fall of Roe.86  
Although the new abortion bans are likely unconstitutional under 
Roe, if the question is turned back to the states, then pregnant people, 
abortion providers, and those who assist them will surely see state-
sanctioned criminalization in “ban states” and attempts by some 
prosecutors to bring criminal charges against pregnant people who 
abort their pregnancies or engage in behavior deemed to threaten a 
fetus.87  What we know from U.S. history, as well as present trends, 
is that those most likely to be criminalized for pregnancy outcomes 




85. June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/ca
se-files/cases/june-medical-services-llc-v-russo/ [https://perma.cc/5M2S-HJ3L] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
86. Joanna L. Grossman, Women Are (Allegedly) People, Too, 114 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 
ONLINE 149, 153–54 (2019) (“Today, constitutional abortion rights hang by a thread,
as newly appointed Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh portend a stark
rightward shift.  This has created opportunities for states to restrict abortion––multiple
states have passed near or total bans in the last few months in the hopes of bringing
about a post-Roe world.”); Elizabeth Dias et al., ‘This is a Wave’: Inside the Network
of Anti-Abortion Activists Winning Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/us/anti-abortion-laws.html [https://perma.cc
/RWG2-GBEV].  Further, the retirement of Justice Kennedy and replacement of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg by Amy Coney Barrett serves only to bolster the validity
of such fears. Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the
Supreme Court to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/article/amy-barrett-views-issues.html [https://perma.cc/UQ5P-RCJV]; Josh Gerstein,
How Amy Coney Barrett Might Rule, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2020, 7:12 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/26/how-amy-coney-barrett-might-rule-4220
55 [https://perma.cc/R74N-KPU8] (discussing retirement of Justice Kennedy).
87. See Dias et al., supra note 86; see, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, Alabama Woman Who Was
Shot While Pregnant is Charged in Fetus's Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/pregnant-woman-shot-marshae-jones.html
[https://perma.cc/9YU3-S85U].
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are  people of color, immigrants, low-income individuals, and those 
with any combination of these characteristics.88 
Much like the period in the mid-to-late 1800s—when abortion 
became regulated, criminalized and moved entirely into the realm of 
mostly male physicians—the current political environment is 
characterized by heightened levels of xenophobia and a misogynistic 
preoccupation with preserving white-male privilege.89  Reproductive 
rights advocates have responded with a number of creative strategies 
to meet a potential future when abortion is either outlawed or more 
restricted; prominent among these strategies is a push to make 
medication abortion more accessible and to increase access to 
providers across state lines.90  Patients access these alternative 
methods online, through search engines and online information 
groups.91  But in a post-Roe world, accessing even medicated 
abortion or self-inducing a termination of pregnancy through any 
means will still be illegal for people in those states that have 
88. Renee B. Sherman, Recent Abortion Bans Will Impact Poor People and People of
Color Most, VOX (May 18, 2019), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2019/5/18/186
30514/missouri-alabama-abortion-ban-2019-racism [https://perma.cc/7V29-7JVM];
Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and
the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 770, 815,
820–22 (2020) (analyzing criminalization of poor and white pregnant women despite
their white privilege).  “[It] is because they are racially privileged that they have been
subjected to excessive, abusive state power. This is to say that white privilege is
present and operating even when white people experience bad outcomes. In many
cases, those poor outcomes are direct consequences of white privilege.” Id. at 776.
89. Jamil Smith, The Harm Done for White Men, ROLLING STONE (May 17, 2019, 5:36
PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/white-patriarchy-abortio
n-ban-law-837026 [https://perma.cc/DXY7-TPAX] (“In my native Ohio, a child who
is raped might not even know she is pregnant before she runs out of time to abort her
rapist's fetus. Missouri sent its eight-week restriction to its eager Republican governor
for signature on Friday. And Alabama's law, arguably the most barbaric of them all,
criminalizes the procedure from the moment of conception and carries a prison
sentence for doctors of up to 99 years. That is a much longer bid than the maximum
any rapist in the state could get, all while his victim is forced to bear his child.  Each
law, in its own way, subjugates women and girls—and since white women
statistically have greater access to the procedure, signals a specific attack on women
of color. This is a particular issue in Georgia, where noted vote suppressor Brian
Kemp is governor. Under the law scheduled to go into effect on January 1st, women
who self-terminate their pregnancies can be imprisoned for life or executed, thereby
accomplishing two goals: subduing them for their gender, and taking away their
ballot. (Men who impregnated them, per the law, suffer no consequence.)”).
90. See Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 2019), https://www.guttmacher
.org/evidence-you-can-use/medication-abortion [https://perma.cc/TWK2-JECD].
91. Id.
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outlawed it.92  This creates the possibility that those who induce or 
assist a woman with an abortion will be criminalized, with the main 
tool of investigation being people’s web searches and other digital 
trails.93  This means that those providing health services and defense 
lawyers will need to develop new understandings of how the use of 
technology can expose people to arrest and prosecution.94 
B. Rise of Self-Induced Abortions
As a result of increasingly restricted access to abortions in clinical
settings, people seeking to terminate pregnancies and their advocates 
have evolved their means of access.95  Practitioners and patients in 
the reproductive health care field increasingly rely on abortion pills 
(commonly referred to as “medication abortion”), which creates new 
opportunities for access to abortion but also new vulnerabilities for 
providers and patients.96  New research by the Guttmacher Institute 
released in September 2019 found that while abortions performed in 
clinics have declined since 2014, medication abortion was used by 
“[a]n estimated 60 percent of women who were early enough in 
pregnancy [to] [choose] to use abortion pills in 2017 . . .  and the pills 
accounted for 39 percent of all abortions that year.  Nearly a third of 
clinics in 2017 offered only medication abortion.”97  Medication 
abortions have increased 25% in nonhospital facilities since 2014.98  
The recent availability of medications online, the simplicity of their 
administration, and the rise of new websites instructing women how 
92. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 3.
93. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see infra notes 170, 186 and accompanying
text.
94. See, e.g., Our Data Bodies Project, OUR DATA BODIES, https://www.odbproject.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Appendix-C-Factsheet-r1.pdf [https://perma.cc/95BH-C
SEK] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
95. See Medication Abortion, supra note 90.
96. See id.; Sherman, supra note 88 (“Unfortunately, the 'future' of criminalized abortion
is already here.  Despite medication abortion pills, for example, being safe enough to
self-administer without a provider present, most states do not allow a person to self-
manage their own abortion.  Should we elect to self-managing our abortions, we are
considered the provider and will be prosecuted as such.  The risk is not in safety: it's
in legality.”).
97. Pam Belluck, America's Abortion Rate Has Dropped to Its Lowest Ever, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/health/abortion-rate-dropped.html [https://perm
a.cc/NUP9-UGDA] (Sept. 20, 2019) (citing RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., ABORTION
INCIDENCE AND SERVICE AVAILABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017 (2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/abortion-incidence-service-
availability-us-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H78-FZVV]).
98. JONES ET AL., supra note 13, at 8, 20 tabl.6.
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to self-induce abortions make it inevitable that medication abortions 
will only increase in the future, especially as clinics continue to close 
and new restrictions on abortion access are legislated.99  The 
Guttmacher report also documents a parallel increase in self-managed 
abortions, up from 12% since 2014 to 18% in 2017, with the highest 
reported numbers coming from non-hospitals in the Southern and 
Western regions of the United States.100  
III. THE TECH-ASSISTED FUTURE CRIMINALIZATION OF
PREGNANT PEOPLE AND ABORTION PROVIDERS
A. Tech-Assisted Future Criminalization of People.
For all the reasons discussed in Part II—lack of access, privacy,
privilege, money, and mobility—pregnant people are now more 
likely to self-manage their abortions rather than visit a medical 
facility.101  Like many Americans seeking medical advice, the first 
obvious step many pregnant people will take to self-manage their 
abortion will be what they may assume to be a solitary consultation 
with their personal digital device.102  Whether this leads them to an 
online medical or commercial provider of abortion pills, or a network 
of underground abortion doulas, this initial research that lends a false 
sense of privacy may leave a detailed data trail for those whose 
devices later become evidence in an investigation.103  
In addition to online search histories, other types of digital 
evidence can also be culled to support a prosecution, including 
location-tracking data, website navigation histories, purchasing 
history, social media activity, wearable device data, data entered into 
apps, and home devices connected to the internet.104 
1. Most Americans seek medical advice online at increasing rates.
Nearly twenty years ago, the Pew Internet & American Life Project
released a study documenting that already “80 percent of Internet 
users, or about 93 million Americans, have searched for at least one 
99. See id. at 1; Megan K. Donovan, Self-Managed Medication Abortion: Expanding the
Available Options for U.S. Abortion Care, 21 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 41, 41 (2018).
100. JONES ET AL., supra note 13, at 8.
101. See supra Part II.
102. Many Young Women in the United States Turn to Google for Information on Self-
Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/news-
release/2018/many-young-women-united-states-turn-google-information-self-abortion
[https://perma.cc/9EGJ-TJQV].
103. See infra Section III.A.3.
104. See infra Section III.A.6.
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of 16 major health topics online.”105  Since 2003, the number of 
Americans searching for major health topics online has increased as 
web-based medical information is replacing shortages in doctors, 
medical facilities, and hospitals, which are all drastically decreasing 
in rural areas due to lower Medicaid funding.106  This still leaves 
gaps in services, for example, in rural areas, accessing the internet 
may still be through a phone connection rather than broadband.107  
Many in the medical community embrace the development of online 
medical care, emphasizing that while online, doctors can diagnose 
and treat a large range of issues.108  Additionally, “[p]rescriptions 
may be transmitted to pharmacies and patients never need to go to an 
overcrowded, germ riddled doctor’s office for evaluation and a 
prescription.”109  The same satisfaction is reported among patients, 
who prefer the online experience because of the “convenience and 
decreased costs. Some patients felt more comfortable with video 
visits than office visits and expressed a preference for receiving 
future serious news via video visit, because they could be in their 
own supportive environment.”110  While some patients reported 
concerns about privacy, it was mainly in the context of whether their 
105. Jane Weaver, More People Search for Health Online, NBC NEWS (July 16, 2003, 4:15
AM), www.nbcnews.com/id/3077086/t/more-people-search-health-online#.X0vhMch
KhPZ [https://perma.cc/FX2E-K5BK].
106. The State of Online Medical Care in 2020, ONLINE DR., https://onlinemedicalcare.org
/state-of-online-medical-services/ [https://perma.cc/MX3V-KH2P] (last visited Nov.
3, 2020) (“[T]he U.S. will experience a shortage of over 100,000 physicians by 2030 .
. . .”); THE CHARTIS GRP., THE RURAL HEALTH SAFETY NET UNDER PRESSURE: RURAL
HOSPITAL VULNERABILITY 2, 4 (Feb. 2020), https://www.ivantageindex.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/CCRH_Vulnerability-Research_FiNAL-02.14.20.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/EKZ3-EYQC] (“[T]he [hospital] closure crisis has affected rural hospitals
located in non-Medicaid expansion states much more so than in states that have
expanded Medicaid.”).
107. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/
reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/eighth-broadband-progress-report
[https://perma.cc/85FE-EW73] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“[A]pproximately 19
million Americans—6 percent of the population—still lack access to fixed broadband
service at threshold speeds.  In rural areas, nearly one-fourth of the population—14.5
million people—lack access to this service.  In tribal areas, nearly one-third of the
population lacks access.  Even in areas where broadband is available, approximately
100 million Americans still do not subscribe.”).
108. The State of Online Medical Care in 2020, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Rhea E. Powell et al., Patient Perceptions of Telehealth Primary Care Video Visits,
15 ANNALS FAM. MED. 225, 225 (2017).
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coworkers could overhear, and not about what digital trails their 
engagement was leaving.111 
2. Pregnant people are also seeking medical advice online at
increasing rates.
Pregnant people seeking information about their reproductive
health are going online for the same reasons.112  Like everyone else 
seeking information online, they prefer the online experience because 
of the decreased costs, the appeal of not traveling, and having the 
ability to manage their health in what feels like a private manner.113  
While the online environment gives the seeker of medical 
information a feeling of privacy, internet use is actually easily 
surveilled.114  Every mouse or finger hover, click, keystroke, pause, 
and purchase is recorded and tracked.115  This is especially true for 
pregnant people.116  Research by advertising companies has taught 
them that major life events, like pregnancy, can trigger new spending 
habits that companies want to capitalize on.117  “Parents-to-be are 
incredibly valuable customers, guaranteed to drop lots of money for 
18 years or more, so companies go to great lengths to identify them 
and to snag them as customers.”118  In other words, the profile of a 
person who may be pregnant or trying to become pregnant is already 
defined by data collection firms who sell those profiles to 
111. Id. at 227 (“While they noted the advantage of not missing work, those without
private offices struggled to find space where coworkers would not overhear.  One
person reported that the inability to achieve privacy at work impaired their ability to
have a proper exam.  A few participants suggested potential workplace privacy
solutions including use of headphones and reserving office space for the visit.”)
112. Marie Solis, 3 Women on What It's like to Give Yourself an Abortion, VICE (Feb. 24,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/epg5xm/give-yourself-an-abor
tion-with-pills-bought-online-aid-access [https://perma.cc/5L7A-4UGB].
113. Id.
114. See Jacob Kastrenakes, Congress Just Cleared the Way for Internet Providers to Sell








118. Kashmir Hill, You Can Hide Your Pregnancy Online, but You’ll Feel like a Criminal,
FORBES (Apr. 29, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill
/2014/04/29/you-can-hide-your-pregnancy-online-but-youll-feel-like-a-criminal/#26e
a761921f3 [https://perma.cc/Y8J7-VSE9].
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advertisers.119  They have refined this profile so well for the pregnant 
demographic that, in at least one situation, advertisers were aware of 
a pregnancy before the pregnant girl knew, or at least before she 
informed her father.120  In 2012, a father stormed into a large retail 
store upset that it was mailing advertisements for baby items to his 
teenage daughter, only to find out one week later that she was indeed 
pregnant.121   
In response to this news story, a Princeton sociology professor, 
Janet Vertesi, attempted to hide her pregnancy from the internet.122  
She and her husband bought gift cards, used cash, and did not 
mention the pregnancy in social media, emails or texts.123  She relied 
on her friends and family also following strict rules about not 
mentioning her pregnancy in online communications.124  She 
successfully went through pregnancy without the usual bombardment 
of baby-related ads targeted at her, but did not recommend this 
approach to others: "[o]pting out makes you look like a criminal . . . . 
[i]t’s incredibly inconvenient. It isn’t sustainable . . . .”125  For a
person like Professor Vertesi, who is pregnant and wants to hide their
status from the internet, even taking basic protective measures to
avoid digital tracking can prove problematic.126  Some  of the steps
Professor Vertesi was required to take to avoid digital tracking raised
red flags.127  For example, “her husband had to get over $500 in gift
cards at a Rite Aid, where he noticed a warning that the Rite Aid
might limit prepaid card purchases and was required to ‘report
excessive transactions to the authorities.’”128  While her experiment
did not result in actual criminal consequences for her or her husband,
it easily could have for a person with different social status or skin
color.129
119. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You,
PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 1:59 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/everything
-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you [https://perma.cc/HLK6-2Y77].
120. Bourdet, supra note 116.
121. Id.







129. See infra Part III.A.3.
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People seeking to self-manage their abortions online commonly 
search for and purchase abortion pills.130  Abortion pills are the 
potential “Holy Grail”131 of reproductive health because they are 
portable, simple to self-administer, and safe.132  With the ability to 
purchase them online, abortion pills have all but replaced traditional 
abortion procedures in medical settings.133  Responding to 
Guttmacher Institute’s 2019 findings of decreased abortions in the 
United States, the New York Times pointed to abortion pills 
purchased online in an article titled Why America’s Abortion Rate 
Might Be Higher Than It Appears.134  It reported that Aid Access, an 
online abortion-pill medical provider,135 “reported 21,000 requests 
for medications for self-induced abortions last year, in its first year in 
the country.  Plan C, which provides information about self-managed 
medication abortions, reports about 40,000 online visitors a 
month.”136  From January 2015 through January 2020, consistent 
searches for “abortion pills” were made in thirty-nine states, most 
frequently in Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and 
Texas.137  Of course, most of these states have seen new restrictions 
on abortion introduced in the past few years.138 
130. See Beverly Winikoff, Will a New Kind of Pill Be the Holy Grail We Seek?,
CONSCIENCE (Sept. 20, 2019), https://consciencemag.org/2019/09/20/will-a-new-kind-
of-pill-be-the-holy-grail-we-seek/ [https://perma.cc/B5XB-JAY2].
131. Id.
132. The SIA Legal Team, supra note 48; Aiken et al., supra note 49 (finding that “[s]elf
sourced medical abortion using online telemedicine can be highly effective, and
outcomes compare favourably with in clinic protocols”); Belluz, supra note 49;
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 49, at 46; Winikoff et al., supra note 49 (“The
medical regimen had more side effects, particularly bleeding, than did surgical
abortion but very few serious side effects. Failure rates for medical abortion, although
low, exceeded those for surgical abortion: 8.6% versus 0.4% (China), 16.0% versus
4.0% (Cuba), and 5.2% versus 0% (India). Nearly half of failures among medical
clients were not true drug failures, however, but surgical interventions not medically
necessary (acceptability failures or misdiagnoses). Women were satisfied with either
method, but more preferred medical abortion.”).
133. See Claire Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, Why America’s Abortion Rate Might
Be Higher Than It Appears, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/20/upshot/abortion-pills-rising-use.html [https://perma.cc/JN9L-RV9H];
Katie Kindelan, ‘Self-induced Abortion’ Searches on Google Reflect a Dark Reality
for Many Women, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2018, 4:27 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA
/News/induced-abortion-searches-google-reflect-dark-realitywomen/story?id5623222
[https://perma.cc/KX2Y-KYW6].
134. See generally Miller & Sanger-Katz, supra note 133.
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. Miller & Sanger-Katz, supra note 133.
137. “Abortion Pills”, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=tod
ay%205y&geo=US&q=abortion%20pills [https://perma.cc/NS6T-HJQA] (last visited
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A report published in Contraception Magazine confirmed that most 
of these websites are delivering real pills.139  The researchers 
“searched the internet to identify a convenience sample of websites 
that sold mifepristone and misoprostol to purchasers in the United 
States and attempted to order these products.”140  They identified the 
prices, shipping times and additional details regarding the ordering 
process, and finally tested the samples in labs.141  In their conclusion 
the researchers stated as follows: 
Our study found no evidence that, at the time of the study, 
mifepristone and misoprostol products sold online were 
dangerous or ineffective. We encourage reproductive health 
providers, advocates and policy makers to think creatively 
about how the internet might be useful for enhancing access 
Nov. 9, 2020).  Google Trends documents the frequency with which people have 
searched for specific terms online with chronologies, geographic breakdown in the 
United States, related topics, and related queries.  See, e.g., id. 
Google Trends normalizes search data to make comparisons 
between terms easier. Search results are normalized to the time 
and location of a query by the following process: 
• Each data point is divided by the total searches of the
geography and time range it represents to compare relative
popularity. Otherwise, places with the most search volume
would always be ranked highest.
• The resulting numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100
based on a topic’s proportion to all searches on all topics.
• Different regions that show the same search interest for a
term don't always have the same total search volumes.
FAQ About Google Trends Data, GOOGLE: TRENDS HELP, https://support.google.com/ 
trends/answer/4365533?hl=en [https://perma.cc/6JQS-GAFE] (last visited Nov. 4, 
2020). 
138. See Elizabeth Nash et al., supra note 13.  To clarify, there are two articles by
Elizabeth Nash cited at note 13.  This note cites the Nash source titled “State Policy
Trends 2019: A Wave of Abortion Bans, but Some States Are Fighting Back.”
139. Chloe Murtagh et al., Exploring the Feasibility of Obtaining Mifepristone and
Misoprostol from the Internet, 97 CONTRACEPTION 287, 287 (2018).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 288.
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to safe and effective abortion in the United States and other 
similarly disadvantaged settings.142 
This increased reliance on web-based services—from the online 
search engine to the website for abortion pill vendors to the cashless 
purchase of pills online—forces a pregnant person to engage with a 
system that actively collects, stores, and sells their online activity 
data.143 
 This exposure is not unique to pregnant people, but the risk of 
exposure carries more consequences for them if their digital devices 
become evidence in a case against them or an abortion pill 
provider.144  Anti-abortion activists and lawmakers are already on the 
offensive against this trend; for example, Texas anti-choice activists 
are advocating for a bill that would make it a felony to mail abortion 
pills to someone in Texas, allowing the State to prosecute and 
demand extradition of the accused person to Texas.145  
142. Id. at 291.
143. See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset,
Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2
019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/5QCN-4MVA]
(“The data reviewed by the Times . . . didn’t come from a telecom or giant tech
company, nor did it come from a governmental surveillance operation. It originated
from a location data company, one of dozens quietly collecting precise movements
using software slipped onto mobile phone apps. You’ve probably never heard of most
of the companies — and yet to anyone who has access to this data, your life is an
open book. They can see the places you go every moment of the day, whom you meet
with or spend the night with, where you pray, whether you visit a methadone clinic, a
psychiatrist’s office or a massage parlor.”).  COVID-19 has escalated that reliance,
prompting calls from advocates and the medical profession to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to loosen the current requirement that medication abortions be
prescribed with a clinical exam.  See, e.g., The Coronavirus Crisis Must Be a Wake-
Up Call to Demand Reproductive Self-Determination for All, IF/WHEN/HOW,
https://www.ifwhenhow.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20_04_02_Policy_Platform
_COVID19_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z8B-PAFA] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020);
see also Patrick Adams, Amid Covid-19, a Call for M.D.s to Mail the Abortion Pill,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/opinion/covid-
abortion-pill.html [https://perma.cc/EL3B-FWDV].
144. See infra Sections III.A.3–.7.
145. María Méndez, As More People Search for Abortion Pills Online, Texas Opponents
Push to Restrict Access, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.
dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/12/02/as-more-people-search-for-abortion-pills-
online-texas-opponents-push-to-restrict-access/ [https://perma.cc/R7UH-MZZ2].
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3. Searches of digital devices by state agencies is an increasingly
common form of surveillance, especially of Black individuals
and other people of color dependent on state resources.
The risk of going online for information related to terminating a
pregnancy may feel remote, and for some pregnant people, it is.146  
For the majority of people searching for health-related information 
online, whether anyone will ever review their search or purchasing 
history is, at best, a remote possibility.147  But internet access has 
become increasingly affordable to a larger population.148  In 2019,  
the Pew Research Center on the Internet and Technology reported in 
2019 that those who are “Smartphone Dependent” now commonly 
includes “younger adults, non-whites and lower-income Americans,” 
and that the majority of Americans from a wide-range of 
demographic backgrounds own a smartphone.149 
Young people of color, including girls and women from low-
income communities, are surveilled, searched and seized by multiple 
state authorities at disproportionately higher rates than their white 
peers, making it more likely that their digital devices will be as 
well.150  Black communities specifically have suffered more intrusive 
levels of surveillance dating back to slavery.151  “Plantation ledger 
books served as proto-biometric databases, recording the slaves as 
146. See BARTON GELLMAN & SAM ADLER-BELL, THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF
SURVEILLANCE 5–6 (2017), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/12/031
51009/the-disparate-impact-of-surveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWN2-RHZQ].
147. See id.
148. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ [https://perma.cc
/7N3L-79J9]; LOGAN KOEPKE ET AL., MASS EXTRACTION: THE WIDESPREAD POWER OF
U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT TO SEARCH MOBILE PHONES 4, (2020), https://www.
upturn.org/static/reports/2020/mass-extraction/files/Upturn%20-%20Mass%20Extract
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D2G-XNBC].
149. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, supra note 148.  Following the COVID-19
outbreak, reliance on digital devices for everything from telemedicine to “remote
learning” has obviously increased.  U.S. Study Finds COVID-19 Pandemic
Transforms Cell Phone Usage, CISION (May 28, 2020), https://www.prnewswir
e.com/news-releases/us-study-finds-covid-19-pandemic-transforms-cell-phone-usage-
301066502.html [https://perma.cc/D8CN-9FM7].
150. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; Melinda D. Anderson, When School Feels
Like Prison, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/educat
ion/archive/2016/09/when-school-feels-like-prison/499556/ [https://perma.cc/L47L-S
9JU].
151. GELLMAN & ALDER-BELL, supra note 146.
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physical specimens in fine detail. The slave pass, the slave patrol, and 
the fugitive slave poster—three pillars of information technology in 
their day—prefigured modern policing, tracking, and photo ID.”152  
Control over the physical body during slavery extended to control 
over Black women’s bodies and reproductive health as well.153 
[C]hildbearing during slavery was often intrinsically related
to an economic system that benefitted white slave owners
more so than a matter of personal freedom. Because
enslaved women and girls were denied reproductive rights
to control their own sexuality, they were unable to
determine with whom they engaged in sexual relationships.
Women who were considered ‘strong’ were sold as breeders
and routinely sexually assaulted to birth more children into
slavery. Some enslaved females attempted to avoid being
sexually exploited for these purposes and aborted their
pregnancies as an act of resistance.154
Civil and criminal justice actors—whether police, social workers or 
public health care workers—can gain access to one’s digital devices 
through a variety of tools.155  Most commonly, people share their 
devices upon request by a social worker, police officer, counselor, or 
nurse during a questioning that may range from feeling like a casual 
conversation to a coercive interrogation.156  Some public welfare 
152. Id.
153. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY, 27–28 (1998) (“The law reinforced the sexual exploitation of
slave women in two ways: it deemed any child who resulted from the rape to be a
slave and it failed to recognize the rape of a slave woman as a crime.”).
154. Cynthia Prather et al., Racism, African American Women, and Their Sexual and
Reproductive Health: A Review of Historical and Contemporary Evidence and
Implications for Health Equity, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 249, 251 (2018) (footnotes
omitted).
155. See Danielle Keats Citron, Comment, A Poor Mother's Right to Privacy: A Review, 98
B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2018) (“When pregnant women seek government assistance
for medical care, the State demands a dizzying array of personal information. In
addition to the expected health exams to determine pregnant women’s physical health,
state Medicaid rules require assessments of their ‘nutritional status, health education
status, and psychosocial status.’ Data is collected about poor pregnant women's
‘formal education and reading level,’ ‘religious and cultural influences,’ ‘history of
previous pregnancies,’ ‘general emotional status and history,’ ‘wanted or unwanted
pregnancy,’ ‘personal adjustment to pregnancy,’ ‘substance use and abuse,’
‘housing/household,’ and ‘education/employment.’”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1162.
156. See id. at 1142 (explaining most vulnerable members of society heavily surveilled and
must surrender information to receive public benefit programs); see also KOEPKE ET
AL., supra note 148, at 46–47.
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agencies have the ability to track a recipient’s purchasing data 
tracked by the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards they provide 
for basic necessities.157   Some countries, states, and cities around the 
world have even expanded this to include biometric data collection as 
a condition of state welfare programs.158  Federal law enforcement 
agencies increasingly request warrants and subpoenas for cell phone 
and computer data during the course of an investigation before 
charging the accused with the relevant crime.159  After a criminal 
prosecution has been initiated, a prosecutor may also ask the accused 
to sign a waiver allowing them to access their phone or request a 
warrant from the court.160  
157. See Mario Moretto, LePage Releases EBT Data Showing Transactions at Strip Clubs,
Bars, Smoke Shops, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2014), https://bangordaily
news.com/2014/01/07/politics/lepage-releases-ebt-data-showing-transactions-at-strip-
clubs-bars-smoke-shops/ [https://perma.cc/UQQ8-RS2R].
158. See Frank Hersey, 2019: A Critical Year for Biometrics and Digital ID in the Global
South, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201912
/2019-a-critical-year-for-biometrics-and-digital-id-in-the-global-south [https://perma.
cc/83R2-PA9B] (illustrating how various governments are implementing universal
biometric ID schemes and how healthcare services are starting to incorporate these
schemes).
159. See David Kravets, We Don't Need No Stinking Warrant: The Disturbing, Unchecked
Rise of the Administrative Subpoena, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2012, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2012/08/administrative-subpoenas/ [https://perma.cc/J2YE-H
CQ2].
With a federal official’s signature, banks, hospitals, bookstores, 
telecommunications companies and even utilities and internet 
service providers – virtually all businesses – are required to hand 
over sensitive data on individuals or corporations, as long as a 
government agent declares the information is relevant to an 
investigation. Via a wide range of laws, Congress has authorized 
the government to bypass the Fourth Amendment – the 
constitutional guard against unreasonable searches and seizures 
that requires a probable-cause warrant signed by a judge. In fact, 
there are roughly 335 federal statutes on the books . . . passed by 
Congress giving dozens upon dozens of federal agencies the 
power of the administrative subpoena, according to interviews 
and government reports.  
Id. 
160. See Dana Littlefield, Does Digital Privacy Extend to Criminals on Probation?, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2016, 4:35 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com
/sdut-court-waiver-cellphone-passwords-search-privacy-2016jan15-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/9Y9Q-BAF2] (illustrating example of criminal court defendants asked to
sign waiver to grant prosecution access to cell phone device and password); see
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In the modern context, racial disparities in state surveillance 
programs are usually associated with violations of policing powers, 
such as the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) extensive 
stop and frisk program in New York City, which subjected hundreds 
of thousands of black and brown New Yorkers to unconstitutional 
violations of their body.161  People were not just subjected to stops 
with questioning, they were subject to “being forcibly stripped to 
their underclothes in public, inappropriate touching, physical 
violence and threats, extortion of sex, sexual harassment and other 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”162  A federal court ruling 
forced the NYPD to drastically reduce its use of stop and frisk, but it 
still occurs and is underreported.163  Street stops can be one of the 
means through which people’s digital devices are searched or 
confiscated by state law enforcement.164  For example, some New 
Yorkers have complained that police have searched or deleted 
information from their electronic devices during a street stop.165 
People may or may not additionally share a password with officers, 
but they may not need to.166  While some courts have ruled that the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incriminating testimony 
prohibits government authorities from forcing people to share their 
passwords to devices containing potentially incriminating 
generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014) (holding warrant generally 
required before police can search a defendant's cell phone). 
161. See CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 3 (Sarah Hogarth
ed., 2012).
162. Id. at 5.
163. See Al Baker, Street Stops by New York City Police Have Plummeted, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/nyregion/nypd-stop-and-frisk
.html [https://perma.cc/3CVB-Q76Q].
164. See Stop, Question and Frisk, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/ccrb/investigations/stop-question-and-frisk.page [https://perma.cc/4MA3-5LF3]
(last visited Nov. 5, 2020) (illustrating the varying levels of intrusion possible during
a street encounter with an officer, including the examination of data contained in a
cell phone).
165. See What Types of Abuse of Authority Allegations Have The CCRB Received Over
Time?, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccr
b/policy/data-transparency-initiative-allegations.page#abuse_authority [https://perma.
cc/JA53-B5Y8] (referring to abuse of authority allegations chart in support of
proposition that police have deleted information from civilian's phones during a street
stop).
166. See Susan W. Brenner, The Fifth Amendment, Cell Phones and Search Incident: A
Response to Password Protected?, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 78, 83–86 (2011)
(illustrating responses available to an arrested individual when asked to provide a
password to his phone).
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information,167 the advent of biometric data (fingerprints and facial 
recognition)168 as a means of unlocking a phone or other device has 
strained the definition of “testimony,” making those protections—as 
applied to digital devices—unreliable in some jurisdictions.169  If 
people do not voluntarily hand over their devices to police 
investigators, or if the devices have been separately seized pursuant 
to a subpoena or a search warrant, some data is still accessible 
through digital forensics technologies pursuant to a search warrant or 
a subpoena for the search engine or internet service provider (ISP).170  
If the device was seized, or if the police took a device with a 
person’s consent, mobile device forensic tools such as Cellebrite 
machines have the ability to create a copy of a smartphone or other 
digital device and save it to an external hard drive or USB flash 
drive.171  This copy allows an investigator to easily peruse a phone’s 
contents through keyword searches, image searches, social network 
analyses, and geographic maps, all in a user-friendly presentation.172  
Mobile device forensic tools, used by over 2,000 agencies across the 
United States—including housing authorities, prisons, public schools, 
and all sizes of police departments—can pull three types of 
167. See id. at 86–88; Jesse Coulon, Comment, Privacy, Screened Out: Analyzing the
Threat to Individual Privacy Rights and Fifth Amendment Protections in State v.
Stahl, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 225, 227 (2018) (“Courts have answered this question
in a variety of different ways with a range of results, but no court prior to the Florida
Second District Court of Appeals in 2016, in State v. Stahl, has completely stripped
away an individual's Fifth Amendment right to refuse to give law enforcement the
password to a personal encrypted device.”).
168. See Shams, List of All Fingerprint Scanner Enabled Smartphones, WEBCUSP (Apr. 24,
2018), https://webcusp.com/list-of-all-fingerprint-scanner-enabled-smartphones/ [http
s://perma.cc/5UZU-3GZC].
169. See Heidi Kuffel & Katelyn Rauh, “Face ID is Unavailable. Try Again Later” ¾ 
Can Law Enforcement Force a Suspect to Unlock Their Phone by Face ID or
Fingerprint?, ABA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_
law/publications/committee_newsletters/cyberspace/2019/201902/fa_1/ [https://perma
.cc/3DS2-CN6C]; see Opher Shweiki & Youli Lee, Compelled Use of Biometric Keys
to Unlock A Digital Device: Deciphering Recent Legal Developments, 67 DEP’T JUST. 
J. FED. L. & PRAC. 23, 23 (2019).
170. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS 3 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/21131
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG5Y-UDLK].
171. Jonathan Adkins, Cellebrite Mobile Forensics Tool Demonstration, YOUTUBE (Sept.
9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fEYqpJ6Mrw.  Other companies that
sell mobile device forensic tools include Grayshift, MSAB, Magnet Forensics, and
AccessData.  KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 11.
172. See Adkins, supra note 171; see KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 10.
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information.173  A logical extraction, most commonly used, pulls text 
messages, contact information, call logs, music files, app data, 
pictures, videos, and calendars.174  File systems and physical 
extractions pull even more information, including files and hidden 
files.175  Physical extractions pull all the deleted data on the phone, in 
addition to everything pulled by a logical extraction and a file system 
extraction.176  Some forensic tools can even pull data off of “the 
Cloud” through one’s mobile device.177 
Information from a digital device—whether a wearable “watch,” 
phone or tablet—can collect information about an accused’s location 
history, movements, and mens rea (criminal intent) during the time 
period a crime is believed to have occurred.178  Many criminal 
prosecutions that would have stalled without digital evidence resulted 
in convictions either at trial or in plea bargaining because the digital 
evidence completed the picture of the accused’s involvement, state of 
mind, or intent.179  
One recent example of digital data comes from the 2018 trial in 
New York City of  Chanel Lewis for murdering a woman named 
Karina Vetrano.180  Detectives confiscated Lewis’ phone from the top 
of his dresser during a search of his bedroom.181  The detective 
testified at trial that the phone documented web searches for terms 
such as “arraignment,” “After a Crime, the Price of a Second 
Chance,” “Miranda warning,” “what happens after a felony 
conviction?” in addition to the Catholic “Sacrament of Penance” 
Wikipedia page.182  These web searches, in combination with two 
173. See Adkins, supra note 171; see KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 32.
174. See Adkins, supra note 171; see generally KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 10–31
(providing screenshots of forensic tools illustrating appearance of smartphone
analysis to police and prosecutors).
175. See Adkins, supra note 171.
176. Id.
177. Cellebrite UFED Cloud, CELLEBRITE, https://www.cellebrite.com/en/ufed-cloud/
[https://perma.cc/2GQV-TPPH] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020); see KOEPKE ET AL., supra
note 148, at 17.
178. See GOODISON ET AL., supra note 50, at 3, 7.
179. See, e.g., infra notes 180–88 and accompanying text.
180. Noah Goldberg & Larry McShane, Accused Queens Jogger Killer’s Cell Phone
Offered Glimpse into His Post-killing State of Mind, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 13,
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photos of Vetrano and one of the crime scene, saved from news 
articles, were used as evidence of Lewis’ criminal intent.183 
Prosecutors in the trial of Casey Anthony, a young mother accused 
of killing her toddler daughter, also relied on digital forensics 
analysis to argue that Anthony used the family computer to search for 
“chloroform” eighty-four times on the day her daughter was killed, 
even though it was only once in reality.184  The investigation of the 
murder of Christian Aguilar at the University of Florida in 2012 also 
rested on digital evidence.185  Without many leads, detectives focused 
on a friend of Aguilar’s, Pedro Bravo, and obtained his digital 
device.186  His digital trails revealed a Siri search for “I need to hide 
my roommate,” location information placing Bravo along the same 
route Aguilar’s body had been found, and prolonged use of the 
“flashlight” app an hour after the disappearance.187  Primarily based 
on this digital evidence, Bravo was convicted.188  
When digital forensics are applied to prosecute a murder case, it is 
easy to applaud the power of these tools to peek in the “window into 
the soul.”189  Prosecutors and police do not restrict the use of their 
digital tools to cases involving serious violent felonies.190  Across the 
183. See WKRC, Accused Killer’s Cell Phone Showed Photos of Victim, Searches for
Forgiveness, LOC. 12 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://local12.com/news/nation-world/
accused-killers-cell-phone-showed-photos-of-victim-searches-for-penance [https://per
ma.cc/YZ5Q-S5TN].
184. Lizette Alvarez, Software Designer Reports Error in Anthony Trial, N.Y. TIMES (July
18, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/us/19casey.html [https://perma.cc/38
KP-37SF].  Days after Anthony was acquitted, the developer of the software used to
conduct this analysis disputed that finding publicly, clarifying that the browser search
for “chloroform” had only happened once (not eighty-four times) and that the
prosecutor had withheld that correction from the defense.  Id.  After acquittal, other
reports of Anthony’s Mozilla browser history claimed finding “foolproof suffocation”
or “neck (plus) breaking.”  C.M. “Mike” Adams, Digital Forensics: Window into the
Soul, FORENSIC (June 10, 2019), https://www.forensicmag.com/518341-Digital-
Forensics-Window-Into-the-Soul/ [https://perma.cc/L33E-DE32].
185. GOODISON ET AL., supra note 50, at 2.
186. Id.
187. Laura Mandaro, Murder Suspect’s iPhone History Takes Central Role, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/13/siri-murder-dead-body/
14019383/ [https://perma.cc/U5BZ-WX6G] (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:58 PM).
188. See Audra D.S. Burch, Pedro Bravo Found Guilty of First-Degree Murder of
Christian Aguilar, MIA. HERALD (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:53 AM), https://www.miami
herald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1980000.html [https://perma.cc/
A8GP-EDUU].
189. See Adams, supra note 184.
190. See Kashmir Hill, Imagine Being On Trial. With Exonerating Evidence Trapped on
Your Phone., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/bus
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U.S., police and prosecutors conducted at least 50,000 extractions of
digital devices between 2015 and 2019 for a wide range of crimes
including graffiti, shoplifting, marijuana possession, car crashes,
vandalism, parole violations, public intoxication, prostitution, grand
larceny, promoting prostitution, petit larceny, fraud, trafficking, drug
possession, unlawful disclosure of an intimate image, unlawful
surveillance, and more.191  The old adage “if you have a hammer, you
treat everything like a nail,” often repeated by public defenders and
prosecutors alike to describe state powers, applies in the digital world
as well.192  If abortion, self-induced abortion, possession of abortion
pills, mailing of abortion pills, or assisting an abortion are
criminalized across the U.S., there is no reason to believe that
prosecutors or police will hesitate to perform forensics analysis on
digital devices as part of an investigation into unlawful abortions.193
In fact, this new opportunity to pierce pregnant people’s mindsets
may encourage accelerated criminalization and pretextual
investigations since it simplifies the evidence gathering and
surveillance needed to convict people.194
This level of intrusion is also unfair to people accused of crimes 
because it is one-sided.195  While prosecutors and police have spent 
millions of dollars to build forensics labs, the New York Times 
reported that the majority of public defender offices do not have 
access to the equivalent forensic tools to test the prosecution’s reports 
because they are underfunded, and because police “monopolize the 
experts in the field and forbid them from working for the defense.”196 
The Legal Aid Society, based in New York, is the largest public 
defender agency in the U.S. and is the only office of its kind with a 
competitive digital forensics lab.197  Other offices may have a single 
iness/law-enforcement-public-defender-technology-gap.html [https://perma.cc/VMT4 
-3JQW].  The Manhattan District Attorney’s office spent $10 million on their forensic
lab in 2016.  Id.
191. See Affidavit of John Logan Koepke at 4–5, Upturn v. New York City Police Dep’t,
No. 162380-2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019); KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 41–42.  A
number of the crime-related extractions listed were reported to author by Jerome
Greco, Supervising Attorney of the The Legal Aid Society’s Digital Forensics Unit,
and documented in redacted search warrants and court orders on file with the author.
192. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945 (1999); see also
KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 53.
193. See infra Section III.A.5.
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extraction device or internal expert, but most defenders rely on 
outside consultants (in some jurisdictions, this requires judicial 
approval to authorize funding).198  
Police and prosecutors are not the only state actors who subject 
black and brown people to disproportionate levels of surveillance that 
make their digital devices more likely to be monitored.199  Social 
workers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, school “safety agents,” security 
guards, and caseworkers are all more likely to surveil, search, and 
potentially digitally search Black individuals and other people of 
color.200  Further: 
Black families are more likely to be reported to the child 
abuse hotline and investigated for child abuse and neglect. 
They are more likely to have cases against them 
substantiated and to have their children removed from their 
care. . . . Research shows these racial disparities, resulting in 
the overrepresentation of Black children in the child welfare 
system, are not due to a higher incidence of abuse and 
neglect in Black families as compared to white families.201 
Doctors are more likely to drug test pregnant black women than 
white women, despite similar rates of substance use during 
pregnancy.202  Schools with higher concentrations of students of 
198. Id.
199. Laura T. Kessler, “A Sordid Case": Stump v. Sparkman, Judicial Immunity, and the
Other Side of Reproductive Rights, 74 MD. L. REV. 833, 905–06 (2015).
200. See Dorothy Roberts & Lisa Sangoi, Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare
System Punishes Poor Families of Color, THE APPEAL (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare-system-punishes-
poor-families-of-color-33ad20e2882 [https://perma.cc/9VYV-SVUZ]; see also
Stephanie L. Rivaux et al., The Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Risk:
Understanding the Decision to Provide Services to Clients and to Remove Children,
87 CHILD WELFARE 151, 165–66 (2008).
201. Roberts & Sangoi, supra note 200.
202. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During
Pregnancy  and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (1990) (“Such variations in the reporting of women
to public health authorities were evident in Pinellas County in the fact that a
significantly higher proportion of black women than white women were reported,
even though we found that the rates of substance use during pregnancy were
similar.”).  “Providers' decisions to screen pregnant women for illicit substance use
are influenced by both patients' characteristics and providers' personal attitudes.
Hospital protocols might help reduce the potentially biased impact of attitudes on
screening decisions.”  Bonnie D. Kerker et al., Patients’ Characteristics and
Providers’ Attitudes: Predictors of Screening Pregnant Women for Illicit Substance
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color are more likely to have “more intense security measures.”203  
Receiving public entitlement benefits often exposes recipients to 
higher levels of state surveillance, such as purchase history tracking, 
home intrusions, and searches.204  Some employers have begun 
requiring employees to wear Fitbits, for example, to monitor their 
physical activity.205  While people may not want to use wearable 
devices like Fitbits, some employers have begun requiring their use 
with financial penalties for employees who do not comply.206  For 
employees who cannot afford to lose their job, this surveillance 
technology is forced upon them.207  
The wealth of information collected by digital devices and the 
power of police and other state agencies to conduct digital 
surveillance, combined with the dearth of resources in public 
defender  offices to analyze such evidence, will result in a failure to 
protect many people from being convicted and incarcerated as a 
result of their pregnancy outcomes.208  While we all share a certain 
level of privacy in our smartphones and personal computers, the legal 
status of that information, when shared with third-party internet 
providers and technology companies, remains uncertain.209  
4. Legal status of evidence from digital devices
Unsurprisingly, given the rapid innovation in technology, the
courts have lagged behind  in creating protections around digital 
Use, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 209, 210 (2004); see also Hillary Veda Kunins et 
al., The Effect of Race on Provider Decisions to Test for Illicit Drug Use in the 
Peripartum Setting, 16 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 245 (Mar. 2007), at 5, https://www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2859171/pdf/nihms-182195.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HSN4-M55R]. 
203. Melinda D. Anderson, When School Feels Like Prison, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/09/when-school-feels-like
-prison/499556/ [https://perma.cc/Q5E7-F2YS].
204. See GELLMAN & ADLER-BELL, supra note 146, at 12.
205. Te-Ping Chen, Your Company Wants to Know if You've Lost Weight, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 11, 2019, 11:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-your-company-need-
to-know-your-body-mass-index-11549902536 [https://perma.cc/P9QM-QAFT].
206. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Applications and
Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment
and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 21, 52 (2018).
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
209. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS' ATTITUDES ABOUT 
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND SURVEILLANCE 3 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/inter
net/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZG5-7WB3].
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surveillance and forensics.210  In Riley v. California, the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged, for the first time, that modern cell 
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that 
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”211  The Riley Court held that 
the police required a search warrant for the data stored on the phone 
in that case.212  Four years later, the Court, in Carpenter v. United 
States, confronted the more complex question of whether police 
needed a search warrant to acquire data from cell phone towers that 
were pinged by the movement of an accused person’s phone.213  
Police acquired the data by requesting information from the cell 
phone companies themselves, and this distinction allowed the 
government to argue that the accused waived any expectation of 
privacy because the cell phone companies were “third parties” with 
whom the accused shared information about their location.214  The 
“third-party doctrine” tests for whether one retains a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information shared with another party, and 
has generally prevented people seeking evidence suppression from 
claiming they retained privacy in documents shared with third 
parties.215  Nevertheless, in Carpenter, argued by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the Court again found that the accused had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their data, despite having 
shared it with phone companies, and thus established precedent 
requiring additional constitutional protections.216 
Specifically, the Carpenter Court recognized that our daily reliance 
on cellular devices and the “unique nature of cell phone location 
records” that wireless carriers record with detailed documentation, 
can paint a more detailed portrait than one any device-user is 
prepared to share.217 The Court provided that: 
Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days 
provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s 
210. See Mario Trujillo, Computer Crimes, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 615, 649–51 (2019)
(providing overview of federal statutes governing electronic monitoring); see infra
notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
211. 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
212. See id. at 403.
213. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
214. See id. at 2212, 2219.
215. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citing United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
216. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19.
217. Id.
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whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time-stamped 
data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through 
them his “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”218  
This distance between the intimate level of information we all entrust 
in our phones and the lack of legal protections for that information 
currently makes us all vulnerable to our data being used against us in 
unforeseen ways.219  
i. Post-Carpenter applications to other digital data.
Courts’ application of Carpenter to other digital data, like search
engine queries, purchasing history, and health data from wearable 
devices, is still developing.220  Post-Carpenter, federal courts in the 
First and Fifth Circuits,221 Arizona,222 Rhode Island,223 Minnesota224, 
Washington,225 New York,226 Louisiana,227 and Georgia228 have 
218. Id. at 2217.  For some of the things police could determine about someone from just
their location information, including accessing an abortion clinic, see People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1999 (N.Y. 2009).
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private 
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the 
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the 
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or 
church, the gay bar and on and on. 
Id. 
219. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 221–55.
221. See United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2019); see also United States
v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018).
222. United States v. McCutchin, No. CR-17-01417-001-TUC-JAS (BPV), 2019 WL
1075544, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2019).  But see State v. Mixton, 447 P.3d 829,
836–37, 841 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (finding no federal expectation of privacy but
holding the state constitution protected IP address subscriber information).
223. United States v. Monroe, 350 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48–49 (D.R.I. 2018) (quoting Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)).
224. United States v. James, No. 18-CR-216 (SRN/HB), 2018 WL 6566000, at *4 (D.
Minn.), aff'd, No. 18-CR-216 (SRN/HB), 2018 WL 6529492 (D. Minn. Dec. 11,
2018), vacated, (Dec. 13, 2018), aff'd, No. 18-CR-216 (SRN/HB), 2019 WL 325231
(D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2019).
225. United States v. Barnes, No. CR18-5141, 2019 WL 2515317, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June
18, 2019).
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continued to treat requests by police to Internet Service Providers (or 
“ISPs”) regarding users’ Internet Protocol address (or “IP address”) 
differently than requests to cell phone companies for cell phone 
tower location data.  Courts have based the treatment on various 
distinctions, most emphatically that ISP requests for IP address 
subscriber information are not as comprehensive as cell phone 
company requests for location data and that IP addresses, without 
more, do not reveal the user’s exact location history.229  
Courts have also declined to extend the protections outlined in 
Carpenter based on how voluntary an accused’s engagement was 
with a platform from which police are obtaining information.230  For 
example, while a Minnesota court held that an accused user of a peer-
to-peer network (i.e., Napster, LimeWire, etc.) had an expectation of 
privacy in his anonymous account, it also held that even under 
Carpenter’s higher level of scrutiny, he abandoned any right to 
privacy by using peer-to-peer software, even if he didn’t share the 
files directly with the program.231  A Pennsylvania court, despite a 
226. United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 362–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Brown v. Sprint
Corp. Sec. Specialist, 17-CV-2561(JS)(ARL), 2019 WL 418100, at *4 (E.D.N.Y Jan.
31, 2019).
227. United States v. Felton, 367 F. Supp. 3d 569, 574–75 (W.D. La. 2019).
228. United States v. Jenkins, No. 18-CR-181-MLB-CMS, 2019 WL 2482171, at *2 (N.D.
Ga.), aff'd, No. 18-CR-00181, 2019 WL 1568154 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019).
229. See United States v. Monroe, 350 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48 (D.R.I. 2018) (quoting Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)) (“The FSS’s record of Monroe’s IP
address was not an ‘exhaustive chronicle’ of his physical or digital activities.”); see
also Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 362 (“Although here the Government sought IP address
information for a substantial amount of time and for an inherently mobile device,
Kidd has failed to demonstrate that fact translated into surveillance of Kidd's daily
movements . . . .”); see also United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2019)
(“Hood does not dispute that he voluntarily disclosed the information to Kik that he
now seeks to suppress.”).  But see State v. Mixton, 447 P.3d 829, 842 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2019) (under Arizona state constitution protection of “private affairs,” “internet users
generally have an expectation of privacy in their subscriber information. . . .
Warrantless government collection of this information from an internet service
provider or similar source thus constitutes a significant and unwarranted intrusion into
a person's private affairs¾an intrusion our constitution unambiguously prohibits.”);
see also State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33–34 (N.J. 2008) (affirming suppression under
state constitutional for warrantless request to ISP for IP address subscriber
information).
230. See infra text accompanying notes 231–32.
231. United States v. Shipton, No. 18-CR-202-PJS, 2019 WL 5330928, at *14 (D. Minn.)
(holding that child rescue coalition surveillance tools did not violate Carpenter, with
detailed history and operational overview of Child Rescue Coalition software), aff'd,
No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019).
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concurring justice recognizing that “[a]n Internet search and 
browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled 
[personal computer] and could reveal an individual's private interests 
or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, 
coupled with frequent visits to WebMD,” nevertheless held that child 
pornography found by a repair shop was the type of voluntary 
sharing of digital evidence that abandoned any right to privacy.232 
At least one court post-Carpenter recognizes that a great deal of 
legitimately private information is stored in both smartphones and on 
search engine servers, signaling perhaps a more nuanced approach to 
IP addresses.233  Declining to apply Carpenter’s protections to a case 
challenging the retrieval of subscriber information from an IP 
address, one District Court judge at least “caution[ed] against the 
categorical approach found in most of the post-Carpenter cases 
holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in IP 
address information.”234  Yet the judge still held that the accused 
failed to meet the Carpenter burden, as he and many other judges 
interpret it to mean that the information sought from an IP address 
alone must reveal physical movements.235  This standard fails to 
appreciate the relevance of digital evidence to the similarly revealing 
online movements from search page, to website, to linked resource, 
to video, to comments below videos linked to another page, etc.—
which is often more valuable and more revealing information for the 
government than an accused’s physical location history.236  “[E]ven if 
IP addresses cannot physically ‘track’ people about town, they can 
still show one’s digital travels, personal curiosities, and online 
associations.”237  One does not need to physically visit the abortion 
clinic, the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, a doctor, the library, the 
union hall, or a political office in order for a government agent to 
glean one’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations” from his or her search engine history.238  What one has 
232. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 989 (Pa. 2019) (Wecht, J., concurring in
part) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014)); see also id. at 977
(detailing the holding).
233. See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 367–68.
236. Michael Price and William Wolf, Building on Carpenter: Six New Fourth Amendment
Challenges Every Defense Lawyer Should Consider, NAT'L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. 
LAWS. (July 28, 2019), https://www.nacdl.org/Content/Building-on-Carpenter-Six-
New-Fourth-Amendment-Cha [https://perma.cc/PG6A-LWZC].
237. Id.
238. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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researched—whether medication based abortions, abortion 
procedures, anatomy, people, or places—reveals one’s internal 
dialogue and intent arguably more closely than what one may infer 
from another’s physical location history.239  Fortunately, assuming no 
exceptions apply, some state constitutions have filled the gap and 
given state court judges a basis for suppressing subscriber 
information from IP addresses without a warrant.240  
Similarly, search or web browsing history obtained either through 
the device or from the search engine should also be protected under 
Carpenter because “the deeply revealing nature of [the data]” and 
“its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach . . . does not make it 
any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”241  “Tracking 
cookies, like historical [cell site location information], have outgrown 
the confines delineated by Miller and Smith that have failed to 
accommodate new, ‘distinct categor[ies] of information’ born from 
‘the seismic shifts in digital technology.’”242 
Besides subscriber information through IP addresses, police have 
also tried to obtain an accused’s purchasing history as evidence of a 
crime.243  An Oregon court declined to extend Carpenter to an 
accused’s purchasing history on the online platform eBay, again 
narrowing Carpenter’s protections to location data controlled by 
third parties.244  The court held that “[w]hen [the accused] used the 
online platform, he voluntarily conveyed his purchasing information 
239. See id. at 2223.
240. State v. Mixton, 447 P.3d 829, 837, 842 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (Under Arizona state
constitution protection of “private affairs,” “[w]arrantless government collection of
this information from an internet service provider or similar source thus constitutes a
significant and unwarranted intrusion into a person's private affairs—an intrusion our
constitution unambiguously prohibits.”); State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 34, 38 (N.J.
2008) (“internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber
information . . .”) (affirming suppression under state constitution of warrantless
request to ISP for IP address subscriber information).
241. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
242. Daniel de Zayas, Comment, Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging Expectation
of Privacy in Data Comprehensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV. 2209, 2249 (2019) (quoting Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2219).
243. See infra notes 244–45 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 9–11, 16, 127–
29, 178–79 and accompanying text; see infra discussion at III.A.6 (particularly note
314 and accompanying text).
244. United States v. Schaefer, No. 17-cr-00400, 2019 WL 267711, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 17,
2019).
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to the company and ‘exposed’ that information to the company in the 
ordinary course of business.”245 
However, an Illinois court held that a warrant is required for law 
enforcement to obtain smart-meter electricity data obtained by the 
city.246  In Naperville, the Seventh Circuit held that the smart-meter 
was comparable to the thermal imaging in Kyllo v. United States247 
and that reading them could reveal “when people are home, when 
people are away, when people sleep and eat, what types of appliances 
are in the home, and when those appliances are used.”248  Due to the 
invasiveness of the smart-meter reading and lack of choice in 
submitting information to it, the third-party doctrine did not block 
suppression.249  Advocates in future technology cases should 
similarly pull from other pre-Carpenter cases for principles that 
promote stronger privacy protections from state surveillance not 
limited to revealing location data.250 
Another avenue advocates should explore to strengthen legally 
recognized expectations of privacy include technologies that hold 
medical information, like menstrual cycle apps, wearable devices that 
track heart rate and physical activity, and internet searches for 
medical information.251  Whether Carpenter will protect information 
related to a pregnant person’s web searches for information about 
their reproductive health depends on how the courts treat medical 
information sought online under the third-party doctrine.252  Medical 
records are of course covered by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA),253 and courts have held that patients 
retain privacy interests in their records despite the medical facility 
having custody of those records.254  The ACLU made a strong 
245. Id.; see also United States v. Therrien, No. 18-cr-00085, 2019 WL 1147479, at *3 (D.
Vt. Mar. 13, 2019) (declining to extend Carpenter to Google search history).
246. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528–29 (7th
Cir. 2018).
247. Id. at 525–26 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)).
248. Id. at 526.
249. Id. at 527.
250. See cases cited infra note 254.
251. Carrie N. Baker, Opinion, Period Tracking Apps in an Age of Anti-Abortion




252. See infra text and accompanying notes 256–60.
253. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104–191, § 1173(d)(2), 110 Stat. 1936, 2026.
254. See Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 550–51 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring
warrant for search of medical records in abortion clinic because “all provision of
2020] Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary 45 
argument in an amicus brief that the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) unlawfully sought patient records from a 
prescription drug database for a criminal investigation via an 
administrative subpoena.255 
It is clear that patients retain privacy interests in their medical 
records despite third-party custody, but medical providers are no 
longer the only repositories of medical information.256  As discussed 
above, even though the majority of Americans who use their 
smartphones, computers, “Internet of Things” devices (i.e., Alexa, 
Smart Home devices, etc.), and wearable devices for medical advice 
and health tracking, might reasonably believe that this information 
would be considered very, or at least “somewhat sensitive,” it does 
not change the fact that we are sharing our sensitive medical data 
with third parties.257  Privacy advocates will need to argue that the 
nature of the information contained in devices sought by law 
enforcement is private, sensitive, and confidential, that society 
generally recognizes it as private, as well as arguing that the person 
whose data is sought involuntarily allowed a third-party to hold it in 
its custody.258  As the ACLU argued in Jonas, “[t]he decision to visit 
a physician and pharmacist to obtain urgent medical treatment is not 
in any meaningful sense voluntary.”259  If a  person is seeking online 
reproductive health advice because they have few local alternatives, 
then perhaps one could argue that virtual medicine was one’s only 
alternative and that “there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of 
[medical] data.”260 
medical services in private physicians' offices carries with it a high expectation of 
privacy for both physician and patient”); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67, 78, 86 (2001) (holding urine tests were “searches” within meaning of Fourth 
Amendment and reporting of test results indicating cocaine use to police were 
unreasonable searches). 
255. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent-Appellant at 3, U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Ricco Jonas, No. 19-1243 (1st Cir.
May 29, 2019) [hereinafter Brief in Support of Respondent-Appellant].
256. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
257. MARY MADDEN, PEW RSCH. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 31–39 (2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content
/uploads/sites/9/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [https://perma.c
c/DY4V-BZ5J].
258. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979).
259. Brief in Support of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 255, at 11.
260. Id. at 12 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018)).
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ii. Scope of search warrants for digital data.
In cases where the government serves a judicial search warrant,
advocates should narrow the scope of the search warrant.261  In what 
one scholar coined the “Magistrate’s Revolt,” judges “began to 
include constraints on how the government could execute digital 
searches in the warrants that they issued.”262  The constraints include 
requiring justifications for seizures of specific hardware (rather than 
allowing seizures of all devices), constraints on the timeframe that 
police can search devices,263 constraints on the timeframe of the 
search query,264 the data relevant to the search,265 the search methods 
(e.g., keywords, file types),266 etc.267  
For defenders of pregnant people whose devices have been seized 
pursuant to a search warrant, they should fight to narrow the devices 
that can be searched, narrow the amount of time detectives have to 
perform their search, add language to the search warrant narrowing 
the query by time frame, by file type and data sought, by what crime 
is suspected to be established through the search of the device, and as 
many other specificities as possible.268 
261. See United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129–30 (7th Cir. 1971).
262. Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates' Revolt,
68 EMORY L.J. 49, 61 (2018).
263. United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2014), reh'g granted en banc,
824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (“without some independent basis for its retention of
those documents in the interim, the Government clearly violated Ganias's Fourth
Amendment rights by retaining the files for a prolonged period of time and then using
them in a future criminal investigation.”).
264. People v. Thompson, 178 A.D.3d 457, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (holding search
warrant for phone overly broad when it failed to specify time limitation).
265. Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“[T]he warrant
specifically described the place law enforcement could search—the phone recovered
from Carter—and specifically described what law enforcement could search for—(1)
‘any information relating to calls, messages, including Facebook messages and
accounts,’ and (2) ‘all information . . . that would indicate the identity of the phone's
owner/user.”).
266. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The warrant
obtained for the specific purpose of searching defendant's computers permitted only
the search of the computer files for ‘names, telephone numbers, ledgers, receipts,
addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances.’ The scope of the search was thus circumscribed to evidence
pertaining to drug trafficking.”).
267. See Berman, supra note 262, at 61–62.
268. See United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129–30 (7th Cir. 1971).  Further
complicating the role that digital evidence plays in the courts is that the source of
some digital evidence comes from third-party privately developed software.  See
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).  When defense attorneys
subpoena the software to analyze why the evidence its producing implicates the
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iii. Scope of consent to searches of digital data.
As discussed above, pregnant people should be counseled not to
voluntarily share their digital devices with hospitals or law 
enforcement.269  If they already have shared a device, as many people 
commonly do, advocates can still argue that the search conducted 
lacked knowing and voluntary consent, or was broader than what the 
person handing over their device believed they consented to.270  For 
example, in cases about searches of automobiles, where the 
“consent” was limited in scope to what may be in the trunk, the back 
seat, or the center console, courts have held that the scope of consent 
did not extend to all parts of the car.271  Similarly, advocates should 
argue that to the extent a digital device was voluntarily relinquished 
to the police, the reasonable expectation of the accused was not for 
every piece of data on the phone to be analyzed and digested into a 
two-thousand page digital trail of everything they have done in real 
life and online.272  This requires a detailed factual analysis of the 
circumstances, the area being consented to a search within, the exact 
words said which illustrate that understanding, the reasonable 
meaning of those words in that context, and other details.273 
 The legal status of pregnant people’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy—while still somewhat undetermined—will challenge 
advocates to protect their information absent additional state 
constitutional provisions and state laws protecting the privacy of 
online information along the same lines as protection for self-
incriminating statements under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.274  The types of remedies needed include: suppression 
motions, which will prevent prosecutions based on unlawfully 
accused, they are often met by a motion to quash the subpoena from the company’s 
law firm.  See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property 
in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1349–50 (2018). 
269. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
270. See H. Patrick Furman, The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 23 COLO. 
LAW., 2105, 2106 (1994); see also KOEPKE ET AL., supra note 148, at 46–47
(discussing percentage of extractions based on consent in various cities across the
U.S. between 2015 and 2019).
271. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
272. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
273. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808–09 (1982).
274. See Janelle T. Wilke, Comment, The Fourth Amendment, a Woman’s Right: An
Inquiry into Whether State-Implemented Transvaginal Ultrasounds Violate the Fourth
Amendment’s Reasonable Search Provision, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 921, 934 (2015); see
also, e.g., Coulon, supra note 167, at 86–87 (providing an example where an
individual may invoke right against self-incrimination).
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obtained information;275 private rights of action that will compensate 
people whose rights have been violated;276 the ability to sue 
anonymously to avoid deterring plaintiffs claiming privacy 
violations;277 and standing for stakeholder organizations to bring 
claims on behalf of groups of people whose rights were violated.278 
5. Digital data has already been used against women as evidence of
self-induced abortions.
Laws prohibiting self-induced abortion already make women 
vulnerable to surveillance and prosecution for taking abortion pills in 
some states, and as discussed above in Part II,279 the probability of 
new laws criminalizing abortion-related conduct is high.280  Pregnant 
people seeking to terminate a pregnancy are trackable in multiple 
ways through their digital devices.281  Search browsing history, 
unencrypted communications, location history, purchasing history, 
databases for state police, welfare, and child protective services, 
social media activity, smart home devices, wearable devices, and 
menstrual tracking apps all store information relevant to pregnant 
people’s reproductive health and decisions.282 
Evidence of one woman’s search engine history from her phone 
has already been introduced to support the state of Mississippi’s 
indictment of her.283  In April 2017, Latice Fisher’s husband called 
911 to report that his wife had possibly delivered a baby at home.284  
When EMTs  arrived, they found a 35-week-old and six-pound fetus 
with “no signs of life, . . . blue skin and no heartbeat.”285  Ms. Fisher 
then went with the EMTs to the hospital.286  She was later indicted on 
275. See United States v. Lisbon, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1360–61 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
276. See Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of
Action, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 434–35 (1989).
277. See NAT'L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., PROTECTING VICTIMS' PRIVACY RIGHTS: THE USE OF 
PSEUDONYMS IN CIVIL LAW SUITS 1–2 (2011), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/11778-
protecting-victims-privacy-rights-the-use-of [https://perma.cc/738C-VZEV].
278. See generally, Rosa Kusbiantoro, Human Rights, Access to Remedy, and Stakeholder
Engagement, BSR: BLOG (June 18, 2019), https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-
view/human-rights-access-to-remedy-and-stakeholder-engagement [https://perma.cc/
4XUL-DH83].
279. See supra Section II.A.
280. See The SIA Legal Team, supra note 48, at 5.
281. See id. at 23.
282. Id.
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a second-degree murder charge in January 2018 under the theory that 
the fetus died due to asphyxiation after being born alive, and detained 
under $100,000 bail, facing twenty to forty  years of incarceration 
and possibly life in prison.287  She was later released on bond in 
March of 2018.288 The state’s theory that there had been a live birth 
was based on a “lung float test” which had been used to determine 
whether the lungs respirated.289  After the National Advocates for 
Pregnant Women and local counsel brought to the state’s attorney 
attention that this test lacks scientific validity—with support from 
vigorous organizing efforts by Color of Change and the Mississippi 
Freedom Fund—he dismissed the murder charges in May 2019 
without prejudice.290  A Grand Jury rejected the District Attorney’s 
second attempt at indicting Ms. Fisher for manslaughter in March 
2020.291 
The state’s evidence in its first presentation included that in her 
third trimester, Ms. Fisher “conduct[ed] internet searches, including 
how to induce a miscarriage, ‘buy abortion pills, mifepristone online, 
misoprostol online,’ and ‘buy misoprostol abortion pill online,’” and 
purchased misoprostol online.292  Without the information in her 
phone, it seemed clear that the State would have insufficient evidence 
to sustain a prosecution.293  Her digital data gave prosecutors a 
“window into [her] soul”294 to substantiate their general theory that 
she did not want the fetus to survive even if the abortion medication 
she pursued would have been unable to terminate her pregnancy in 
the third trimester.295 
Another woman, Purvi Patel, was sentenced to twenty years in 
prison for “neglect of a dependent and feticide” after taking abortion 
pills she purchased online.296  Evidence presented against her at trial 
287. Id.; Teddy Wilson, Mississippi Woman Criminally Charged for Pregnancy Outcome
After Home Birth (Updated), REWIRE NEWS GRP., https://rewire.news/article/
2018/02/06/mississippi-woman-criminally-charged-pregnancy-outcome-home-birth/
[https://perma.cc/7L3Z-UK2N] (last updated Apr. 13, 2018, 12:56 PM).
288. See Phillips, supra note 3.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See A No Bill, supra note 11.
292. See Phillips, supra note 3.
293. Id.
294. See Adams, supra note 184.
295. See Phillips, supra note 3.
296. Becca Costello, Indiana Court Overturns Feticide Conviction of Purvi Patel, THE
WORLD (July 22, 2016 2:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-22/indiana-
court-overturns-feticide-conviction-purvi-patel [https://perma.cc/HAN7-HAWT].
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included online research she conducted, the email confirmation she 
received from internationaldrugmart.com, and unencrypted text 
messages to a friend about her relationship, becoming pregnant, and 
the pills she purchased.297  While Patel’s conviction for feticide was 
overturned (the Court ruled the legislature did not intend for a 
pregnant woman to be charged for her own feticide), she was still 
convicted of “neglect of a dependent” and spent more than three 
years detained.298  Once again, without her digital evidence, the 
prosecutor would only have been able to pursue her conviction based 
on medical testimony from her treatment providers and experts.299  
Instead, the prosecutor introduced Ms. Patel’s smartphone and 
iPad—which both contained text messages and emails—as evidence 
against her.300 
Digital evidence fills a gap for prosecutors keen on prosecuting 
women for their pregnancy outcomes.301  When medical theories fail 
297. See Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see Aziza Ahmed,
Floating Lungs: Forensic Science in Self-Induced Abortion Prosecutions, 100 B.U. L.
REV. 1111, 1127 (2020).
298. Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Court Overturns Feticide Conviction of Indiana Woman Who




299. See supra note 297 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 301–02 and
accompanying text.
300. Kelli Stopczynski, Prosecutors: Text Messages Detail Weeks Leading Up to Patel's
Forced Abortion, WSBT (Apr. 2, 2015), https://wsbt.com/news/local/prosecutors-text
-messages-detail-weeks-leading-up-to-patels-forced-abortion [https://perma.cc/3DYV
-XM8H].
301. See Rankin, supra note 11.  Two other women prosecuted for their pregnancy
outcomes based partially on digital evidence include Roberta Baker and Brook Skyler
Richardson.  See Matt McFarland, Mother Goes to Trial for Infant’s Death , DAILY J.,
https://dailyjournalonline.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/mother-goes-to-trial-for-i
nfants-death/article_20a8de66-ef1f-5a02-88c4-73b9c52560e4.html [https://perma.cc/
Y8PM-WCEJ] (June 27, 2019) (detailing use of Baker’s messages and Facebook
photo of baby to argue personal knowledge of medical vulnerability); see Kieth
BieryGolick & Cameron Knight, Ex-Cheerleader Accused of Killing Newborn Found
Not Guilty on Most Serious Charges, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/n
ews/nation/2019/09/12/brooke-skylar-richardson-trial-not-guilty-most-serious-charges
/2305221001/ [https://perma.cc/E4SV-Z7Z7] (Sept. 12, 2019, 5:56 PM).  Ms.
Richardson’s text messages with her mother about her weight were introduced to
demonstrate her vanity about her body during pregnancy, plus “searches on
Richardson’s phone for ‘what happens at the gyno when your (sic) pregnant.’”  Abby
Dawn, Brooke Skylar Richardson to Authorities in 2017 Interview: ‘I think I killed her
… I squeezed her’, WCPO CINCINNATI, https://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news
/warren-county/lebanon/week-2-of-brooke-skylar-richardsons-murder-trial-begins [htt
ps://perma.cc/J7ZJ-HQB9] (Sept. 9, 2019, 9:30PM).
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to explain why some outcomes happened, prosecutors can now sift 
through an accused person’s most personal thoughts, feelings, 
movements, and medically-related purchases during their pregnancy, 
even if there is little evidence supporting the conclusion that their 
conduct caused the pregnancy to end.302 
Miscarriages naturally terminate up to 21% of pregnancies after 
week five and as many as 75% of pregnancies before week five; thus, 
it is not uncommon for a woman contemplating an abortion to 
coincidentally suffer a miscarriage.303  Corporate and state access to 
our digital diaries is a dangerously unregulated area of law, with the 
potential to allow the pregnant people to be caught under a large net 
of surveillance regarding our most intimate thoughts.304 
6. Other types of digital data that could potentially be used to
criminalize pregnant people.
Additional types of data may also be used against pregnant people
and their abortion providers in the future.305  As already discussed, 
location history is available both through digital device extractions 
and subpoenas to cell phone tower companies.306  Pregnant people’s 
locations can also be identified by geofencing, an advertising tool 
used to market products based on the consumer’s location.307 
Geofencing tools have already targeted people entering and leaving 
Planned Parenthood clinics across the country, sending them anti-
abortion messages via their search browser on their digital devices.308  
302. See Rankin, supra note 11.
303. Zawn Villines, What Are the Miscarriage Rates by Week?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan.
12, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/322634#pregnancy-loss-rates-
by-week [https://perma.cc/5R2V-KLHW].
304. See, e.g., infra note 309 and accompanying text.
305. See Aaron Pressman, Anti-Abortion Group Sends Targeted Ads to Women in Planned
Parenthood Clinics, FORTUNE (May 26, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://fortune.com/2016
/05/26/anti-abortion-groups-planned-parenthood/ [https://perma.cc/Q7RA-WB46].
Indeed, it’s possible it has been, and the authors are unaware.  Id.
306. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (explaining cell site
location information).
307. See White, supra note 20.
308. See Sharona Coutts, Anti-Choice Groups Use Smartphone Surveillance to Target
‘Abortion-Minded Women’ During Clinic Visits, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (May 25, 2016,
6:52 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2016/05/25/anti-choice-groups-deploy-smartph
one-surveillance-target-abortion-minded-women-clinic-visits/ [https://perma.cc/4D8J-
JT86]; see Christina Cauterucci, Anti-Abortion Groups Are Sending Targeted
Smartphone Ads to Women in Abortion Clinics, SLATE (May 26, 2016, 4:31 PM),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/05/anti-abortion-groups-are-sending-targeted-s
martphone-ads-to-women-in-abortion-clinics.html [https://perma.cc/8BMF-M8WV].
52 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
In the criminal context, prosecutors have attempted to use reverse 
geofencing technology to identify a suspect of a bank robbery by 
serving Google with a search warrant to produce information on 
every person whose location services indicated they were within a 
radius of the bank around the time of the robbery.309 
Digital advertising broker companies in general are also amassing 
and redistributing large amounts of highly sensitive medically related 
data.310  For example, “a company named MedBase 200 reportedly 
used ‘proprietary models’ to generate and sell marketing lists of rape 
victims, domestic abuse victims, and patients with hundreds of 
different illnesses.”311  Other advertising services sell products that 
allow a company to buy information about all the clicks users make 
on every website, also inferring demographics about each user (e.g.,  
gender and age based on browsing behavior).312  While this type of 
service is supposed to protect users’ personally identifiable 
information, there are “[n]umerous articles and academic studies 
[showing] how it is possible to unmask people using so-called 
anonymized data.”313  
As mentioned above, pregnant people’s purchasing history—
whether produced through credit cards or public benefits cards—is 
also susceptible to profiling them as pregnant, allowing surveillance 
of what food they buy and locations where they make purchases.314  
309. Frank Green, Defense Challenges Use of Google Location Data from Everyone in
Vicinity of Hull Street Road Bank Robbery, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://richmond.com/news/local/crime/defense-challenges-use-of-google-location-da
ta-from-everyone-in/article_9e4f9ca6-d092-5f07-b932-b111553a114d.html [https://pe
rma.cc/4YRK-UD8K].  In Chatrie’s case, the warrant sought location histories kept
by Google of cellphones and other devices used within 150 meters (roughly 500 feet)
of the bank during a period of one to two hours surrounding the time of the crime.
See id.
310. See Neal Ungerleider, The Latest Privacy Risk? Looking Up Medical and Drug




312. See Joseph Cox, Leaked Documents Expose the Secret Market for Your Web







314. See Wootson, supra note 298.  “In 2014, Maine Gov. Paul LePage released data to the
public detailing over 3,000 transactions from welfare recipients using EBT cards in
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Beyond purchasing history collected by state agencies, a vast amount 
of personal, private, and medical information is also collected by the 
state.315 These databases are increasingly broad and 
interconnected.316  “Complex integrated databases collect [poor and 
working class people’s] most personal information, with few 
safeguards,” and “[v]ast complexes of social service, law 
enforcement, and neighborhood surveillance [that] make their every 
move visible and offer up their behavior for government, 
commercial, and public scrutiny.”317 The Alleghany Family 
Screening Tool, for example, was built by integrating multiple 
databases from state and county programs.318 
Twenty-nine different programs—including adult probation, 
the bureau of drug and alcohol services, the housing 
authority, the county jail, the juvenile probation office, the 
Allegheny County police department, the state office of 
income maintenance, the office of mental health and 
substance abuse services, the office of unemployment 
compensation, and almost 20 local school districts—send 
regular data extracts. The extracts include client names, 
social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, and the 
type and amount of services they’ve received.319 
Social media activity—including posts, but also likes, shares, 
comments on other posts, etc.—can also be extracted by investigators 
for evidence of what a pregnant person was thinking of or feeling 
around the time of the pregnancy outcome for which they may be 
the state.”  Virginia Eubanks, How Big Data Is Helping States Kick Poor People Off 
Welfare, NEW AM. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.newamerica.org/fellows/in-the-
news/how-big-data-helping-states-kick-poor-people-welfare/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ8B-
7JTK].  Governor LePage used the data collection ability of the EBT cards to compile 
data on each time EBT’s were used in a strip club, liquor store, smoke shop, or bar, 
arguing for a decrease in state welfare spending.  See id. 
315. See Dennis Anon, What Does the US Government Know About You?, PRIVACY.NET
(Feb. 17, 2018), https://privacy.net/us-government-surveillance-spying-data-collecti
on/ [https://perma.cc/MT2U-EY27].
316. See id.
317. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 11 (2018).
318. A Response to Allegheny County DHS, VIRGINIA EUBANKS (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://virginia-eubanks.com/2018/02/16/a-response-to-allegheny-county-dhs/ [https://
perma.cc/96T3-6BZ4].
319. EUBANKS, supra note 317, at 135.
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under investigation.320  To search social media platforms, many 
police departments do not need access to a device; social media 
platforms grant them special access to perform keyword searches on 
posts geotagged within their jurisdiction.321  Some social scientists 
have even attempted to perform predictive analytics on the language 
used in social media posts to predict future violent behavior amongst 
teenagers.322 
Wearable devices, such as Fitbits,323 Apple Watches,324 and others, 
produce automated data for users to help track their health.325  These 
devices have also become evidence in criminal courts.326  In 
California, the Fitbit worn by a woman killed in her home was used 
to argue that her time of death coincided with surveillance footage of 
320. See Glencorra Borradaile et al., Whose Tweets are Surveilled for the Police: An Audit
of a Social-Media Monitoring Tool via Log Files, in PROC. OF THE 2020 CONF. ON 
FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY SESS. 3 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf
/2001.08777.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY86-YCHY]; see, e.g., Phillips, supra note 3.
Consider the prosecution of Roberta Baker for the death of her prematurely born son
Elijah; her Facebook messages that included a picture of Elijah were used by the
prosecutor to argue her knowledge about her son’s medical vulnerability.  See
McFarland, supra note 301.  Ms. Baker was sentenced to twenty years for failing to
get Elijah medical attention sooner. Matthew McFarland, Baker Gets 20-Year
Sentence for Newborn’s Death, DAILY J., https://dailyjournalonline.com/news
/local/crime-and-courts/baker-gets-20-year-sentence-for-newborns-death/article_28d4
b98a-f89f-5e86-8dde-fe2a10aef7b0.html [https://perma.cc/Z4TQ-3GXK] (Aug. 29,
2019).
321. See Borradaile et al., supra note 320, at 14–15; see also Map: Social Media
Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Jul. 10, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/map-social-
media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties [https://perma.cc/9NYK-X
Z7U].
322. See generally DESMUND UPTON PATTON ET AL., USING NATURAL LANGUAGE
PROCESSING AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS TO INTERVENE IN GANG VIOLENCE: A 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN A SOCIAL WORK RESEARCHERS AND DATA SCIENTISTS
(2016), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1609/1609.08779.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF5
Z-6KNQ].
323. See Lisa Eadicicco, I'm a Loyal Apple Watch User, but After Switching to Fitbit, I
Found 3 Things I Liked Better and 3 Things I Didn't, BUS. INSIDER, (Dec 5, 2019),
https://buisinessinsider.com/apple-watch-series-5-vs-fitbit-versa-2-features-compared
-2019-12 [https://perma.cc/3NSY-ARPY].
324. See Kristen V. Brown, What Happens When the Computer That Keeps You Alive Can
Also Put You in Jail?, GIZMODO (Feb. 14, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://gizmodo.com/
what-happens-when-the-computer-that-keeps-you-alive-can-1792236550 [https://per
ma.cc/F92F-BJH5].
325. See Eadicicco, supra note 323.
326. See Christine Hauser, Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 90-Year-Old Man in
Stepdaughter's Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us
/fitbit-murder-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/S2AV-BKXD].
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her father-in-law’s visit.327  The device detects heartbeat data and the 
State sought to prove that this data showing her escalated heartbeat 
was a result of an attack.328  
Many women enter their menstrual cycle schedules and other 
reproductive health details into various types of apps.329  The 
companies responsible for these apps often sell this data.330  Officials 
in the federal immigration system have purchased similar data,331 and 
rather than relying on warrants, they have used this data to track 
immigrants’ menstrual cycles in order to monitor for pregnancy.332  
New executive rules prohibiting people seeking visas for the 
purposes of giving birth on American soil may also inspire additional 
use of menstrual tracking by the Department of Homeland 
Security.333  
Finally, smart home devices—whether they are Alexa, Google 
Home, smart water meters,334 or any other smart devices that contain 
similar information as a search engine—have also been subpoenaed 
for data recordings contemporaneous with the time and date of a 
crime.335  Amazon has sought a patent for developing technology that 
327. See Lauren Smiley, A Brutal Murder, a Wearable Witness, and an Unlikely Suspect,
WIRED (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://wired.com/story/telltale-heart-fitbit-murder/
[https://perma.cc/4MF2-SPPT].
328. See id.
329. See Hannah Nichols, The 10 Best Period Tracking Apps, MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan. 29,
2018), https://medicalnewstoday.com/articles/320758 [https://perma.cc/DE37-WQ
S3].
330. See Baker, supra note 251.
331. See Jamie Ross, Trump Administration Using Cellphone App Data to Hunt for
Undocumented Immigrants: Report, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:14 AM),
https://thedailybeast.com/trump-administration-uses-your-cellphone-data-for-immigra
tion-enforcement-report [https://perma.cc/H66R-Q34T?type=image].
332. See Jennifer Wright, The U.S. is Tracking Migrant Girls’ Periods to Stop Them from
Getting Abortions, HARPER'S BAZAAR (Apr. 2, 2019), https://harpersbazaar.com/cultur
e/politics/a26985261/trump-administrtion-abortion-period-tracking-migrant-women/
[https://perma.cc/6TJT-AHTP].
333. See id.; see also Ross, supra note 331.
334. See Grace Manning, Online Contribution, Alexa: Can You Keep a Secret? The Third-
Party Doctrine in the Age of the Smart Home, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (2019),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/wp-content/uploads/
sites/15/2019/02/56-O-Alexa-Can-You-Keep-a-Secret-The-Third-Party-Doctrine-in-
the-Age-of-the-Smart-Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XXT-KDQX] ("Indeed, law
enforcement in the Bates case obtained data from Bate's smart water meter without a
warrant after prosecutors thought he may have used it to hose down blood.").
335. See  id.; Minyvonne Burke, Amazon's Alexa May Have Witnessed Alleged Florida
Murder, Authorities Say, NBC NEWS, https://nbcnews.com/news/us-news-amazon-s-
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will recommend purchases based on detections of coughs, sneezes, 
and other symptoms of sickness, suggesting that the technology 
industry is not deterred by claims of reasonable expectation of 
privacy of medical information.336 
Digital devices produce new types of evidence that document not 
only the things that we do, but also the thoughts that we have.337  
Anti-abortion prosecutors and police—who previously only relied on 
medical records, doctors, nurses, experts, and perhaps hearsay from 
people testifying to the pregnant person’s mental state—now have 
access to new tools that give them crucial evidence of what is going 
through a pregnant person’s mind in the weeks and months before 
their pregnancy ends.338 
7. Digital data presents the potential for prosecutors and police to
circumvent medical staff to surveil pregnant people.
In addition to having new tools documenting a pregnant person’s
mental state, anti-abortion prosecutors and police can now 
circumvent the medical staff they previously relied on for reports of 
suspected terminations.339  Prosecutors and investigators could 
potentially subpoena ISP’s for the IP addresses of every search for 
“abortion medication” or “abortion pills” or any other keyword 
combination.340  They could make a similar demand from Google or 
alexa-may-have-witnessed-alleged-florida-murder-authorities-n1075621 [https://perm 
a.cc/2GNH-X4BV] (Nov. 2, 2019, 4:06 PM).
336. See Ivan Mehta, Amazon’s New Patent Will Allow Alexa to Detect a Cough or a Cold,




338. See Baker, supra note 251.
339. See id.
340. Sean Lyngaas, DHS Asks Congress for Subpoena Authority to Contact Vulnerable
Asset Owners, CYBERSCOOP (Oct. 9, 2019), https:/cyberscoop.com/dhs-cisa-
subpoena-authority-vulnerable-asset-owners/ [https://perma.cc/CM83-6U49] ("The
Department of Homeland Security has asked lawmakers for subpoena authority in
order to directly contact organizations vulnerable to hacking rather than having to rely
on outside parties to communicate with the private sector."); see also Sarah Coble, US
Homeland Security Wants to Subpoena ISPs to Hand Over Data, INFOSECURITY MAG.
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/us-homeland-security-
wants-subpoena/ [https://perma.cc/F85E-TN2P] (“The cybersecurity branch of the
Department of Homeland Security has requested legal permission from Congress to
demand data from internet services providers in a bid to prevent cyber-attacks. The
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has chosen National
Cybersecurity Awareness Month to seek administrative subpoena authority, which
will give it the power to compel ISPs to hand over information.”).
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from certain websites themselves.341  If the state has resources, they 
could also purchase the data from electronic health care record 
companies or data brokers that collect users’ internet and purchasing 
history and sell it to advertisers.342  Online search engine 
surveillance, purchasing history, social media communications and 
wearable technology data is not protected by medical privileges and 
is sold by online platforms.343  Investigators could also do keyword 
searches on all social media posts within their jurisdiction to find 
users discussing abortion or any other keyword combination.344 This 
potential circumvention could lead to new ways for people to be 
criminalized for abortion-seeking conduct.345 
341. See Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of Search Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/technology/google-
resists-us-subpoena-of-search-data.html [https://perma.cc/U4J6-AXBT] (“The Justice
Department has asked a federal judge to compel Google, the Internet search giant, to
turn over records on millions of its users’ search queries as part of the government’s
effort to uphold an online pornography law.”); see also Nathan F. Wessler, How
Private is Your Online Search History?, ACLU (Nov. 12, 2013, 12:04 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/how-private-
your-online-search-history [https://perma.cc/KLA6-LUSM]; see also Arturo Garcia,
Did the Justice Department Demand Facebook Information for ‘Anti-Trump
Activists’?, SNOPES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/justice-
department-facebook-anti-trump-activists/ [https://perma.cc/8MEV-S2UD]; see also
Jacob Brogan, The Department of Justice Demands Records on Every Visit to Anti-
Trump Protest Site DisruptJ20, SLATE (Aug. 15, 2017, 12:44 PM), https://sl
ate.com/technology/2017/08/department-of-justice-demands-1-3-million-ip-addresses
-of-visitors-to-disruptj20.html [https://perma.cc/QQ68-HBBC] (“On Saturday, a judge
in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia approved a search warrant that
would require DreamHost, DisruptJ20’s provider, to turn over a wide range of
information about the site and its visitors. In addition to information about the site’s
creators, the DOJ demands ‘logs showing connections related to the website, and any
other transactional information, including records of session times and duration.’ In
short, the government is looking for records of everyone who even visited the site,
which is to say it’s effectively compiling info on those who showed even a modicum
of interest in protesting the administration.”).
342. See Thomas Brewster, Explained: Why the Feds Are Raiding Tech Companies for
Medical Records, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/th
omasbrewster/2020/02/09/explained-why-the-feds-are-raiding-tech-companies-for-me
dical-records/#1c3e01f649eb [https://perma.cc/CXZ9-3DDP].
343. See Laura Harrison, How Pregnancy Monitoring Technology Contributes to the War
on Women, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washington3post.com
/outlook/2019/07/08/how-pregnancy-monitoring-technology-contributes-war-women/
[https://perma.cc/QN42-4CBT].
344. See Coutts, supra note 308.
345. See Baker, supra note 251.
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B. Tech-Assisted Future Criminalization of Abortion Providers.
Pregnant people are not the only ones vulnerable to prosecution
and more vulnerable given their digital trails.346  Rather than initiate 
prosecutions of pregnant people possessing illegally obtained 
abortion pills, the federal government has chosen to strategically 
target the sources of the pills—for now.347 
1. Providers being investigated and prosecuted.
The Guttmacher 2019 report highlighted the website of Aid
Access, an organization founded by Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, that 
offered misoprostol and mifepristone by mail-order nationwide 
starting in March 2018.348  Aid Access reported serving mostly poor 
and low-income women in states with less abortion access.349  It 
caught the attention of the Food and Drug Administration,350 which 
issued a cease and desist letter in March 2019.351  In defiance of the 
FDA’s cease and desist letter, Aid Access has continued to provide 
access to medication abortions through its online consultation and 
mail-order program, although many have complained online in past 
346. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
347. See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
348. See JONES ET AL., supra note 13, at 10; see also About Aid Access, AID ACCESS, https:
//aidaccess.org/en/page/698649/about-aid-access [https://perma.cc/83TQ-RNPM] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2020).
349. See JENNA JERMAN ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION
PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008, GUTTMACHER INST. 3, 13 (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-abortion-
patients-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ5V-FD4F].
350. Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Aidaccess.org (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations
/warning-letters/aidaccessorg-575658-03082019 [https://perma.cc/9DEE-U7J6]; see
also Nancy W. Mathewson, Prohibited Acts and Enforcement Tools, 65 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 545, 546 (2010).
FDA has three types of enforcement tools at its disposal—
advisory actions, administrative actions, and judicial actions—
some established by statute and regulations, while others are a 
matter of policy. Advisory actions include Warning Letters and 
untitled letters. Administrative actions include administrative 
detention, recalls and civil penalties. Judicial actions include 
seizures, injunctions and criminal prosecutions. 
Id. 
351. Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 350; see also Rebecca Gomperts,
FDA vs Aid Access, AID ACCESS (Apr. 2019), https://aidaccess.org/en/page/200797/fd
a-vs-aid-access [https://perma.cc/JX9P-CZDT].
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months about their packages not arriving.352  Dr. Gomperts’ 
arguments in her response to the FDA in May 2019 largely rested on 
Gomperts’ status as a licensed medical professional, the lack of FDA 
jurisdiction over Gomperts’ practice in Austria, and the inclusion of 
medical consultation via telemedicine prior to the medications being 
mailed.353  As of yet, the FDA has not taken additional steps towards 
prosecuting Gomperts but has delayed the packages pregnant people 
have ordered with her prescription.354 
352. See Aid Access, Aid Access Will Continue Providing Abortion Care, FACEBOOK (May
17, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=59583574 4258420
&id=482314375610558&utm_source=planc&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign
=fbaidaccess [https://perma.cc/KTD4-MY6T] (Facebook login required); see also Aid
Access, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/abortion/search/?q=aid%20access&restrict
_sr=1, [https://perma.cc/3B87-LFXM] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (providing forums
to discuss and share information about Aid Access).
353. See Verified Complaint, Gomperts v. Azar, No. 19-CV-003450DCN (D. Idaho July
13, 2020), 2019 WL 4257409.  In September, Aid Access sued FDA officials in
federal district court on behalf of itself, Dr. Gomperts, and women who have sought
medication abortions through the organization (although none of the women are
named, the complaint alleges that 127 of them reside in Idaho).  See id. at ¶ 44.
Gomperts alleged that the FDA restricted the distribution of mifepristone and
misoprostol through the restricted distribution system known as Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) and the Element to Assure Safe Use (ETASU) program
in effect since 2000, creating an undue burden on the rights of women in the United
States to terminate unwanted pregnancies.  See id. at ¶¶ 31–36.  Gomperts also alleged
that since March 2018, she has prescribed misoprostol and mifepristone to 7,131
women in the United States after her review of their medical history.  See id. at ¶¶ 43–
46. The complaint describes the receipt of the FDA letter on March 8, 2019 and
documents that FDA investigators have indeed intercepted approximately three to ten
packages from Dr. Gomperts “based upon tracking information for the packages and
communications from her patients.”  Id. at ¶¶ 58–65, 68.  Her patients have also been
contacted by the FDA through letters and visits, although the FDA stated it “generally
does not take enforcement action against individuals who [import drugs for personal
use].”  Sarah McCammon, European Doctor Who Prescribes Abortion Pills to US
Women Online Sues FDA, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/09/758871490/euro
pean-doctor-who-prescribes-abortion-pills-to-u-s-women-online-sues-fda [https://per
ma.cc/2KFE-PV9U] (Sept. 9, 2020, 5:00 PM).  Her claims against the FDA included
violations of substantive due process (right to privacy), equal protection, and three
violations of the Administrative Procedures Act.  See Verified Complaint, Gomperts,
No. 19-CV-003450DCN, at ¶¶ 92–110.  Gomperts sought multiple injunctions
prohibiting the FDA from seizing her patients’ medications and prosecuting Gomperts
or her patients for the delivery/receipt of misoprostol and mifepristone, in addition to
declaratory relief.  See id. at ¶¶ 20–23.  Gomperts’ lawsuit was dismissed by the
district court on July 13, 2020.  Gomperts v. Azar, No. 19-CV-003450DCN, 2020 WL
3963864, at *11 (D. Idaho July 13, 2020).
354. See Marie Solis, The Unbearable Stress of Waiting for Abortion Pills to Come in the
Mail, VICE (Feb. 26, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/884v7b/
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Distinguishable from Aid Access’s licensed and physician-
supervised program, in June 2019 Wisconsin’s US Attorney’s office 
indicted a New York woman, Ursula Wing, (a web-developer with no 
medical education) for “conspiracy to defraud the United States and 
causing the introduction of misbranded drugs into interstate 
commerce,” in addition to smuggling and selling misoprostol and 
mifepristone via mail-order without a license.355 
From May 2016 through February 2019, Wing mailed over two 
thousand customers medications by using fake jewelry store 
packaging and covertly hiding the pills inside the jewelry box, 
without any advertising.356  While an attorney told Wing that her 
business was targeted as a result of the arrest of a Wisconsin man for 
spiking his girlfriend’s water with the abortion medications, she was 
also potentially targeted by the Federal Government after being 
identified as the “top-rated” self-abortion kit supplier by Plan C.357  It 
could have also been flagged earlier when PayPal stopped allowing 
her to use its platform to receive payments in April 2018 (likely at 
the suggestion of federal investigators).358  Before she was indicted, 
FDA investigators obtained a search warrant for her apartment and 
seized computers, phones, iPads, and medication in February 2019.359  
She was indicted in June and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy.360  
These “underground” networks are more complex than provider-
patient relationships.361  Licensed physicians may also provide the 
medication abortion kits to unlicensed practitioners who assist 
aid-access-abortion-pills-stuck-in-customs [https://perma.cc/RYU5-WU38]. 
355. Grand Jury Returns Indictments, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (June 27, 2019), https:
//www.justice.gov/usao-wdwi/pr/grand-jury-returns-indictments-88 [https://perma.cc/
U2TY-YXUN].
356. See Chelsea Conaboy, She Started Selling Abortion Pills Online. Then the Feds
Showed Up., MOTHER JONES, at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/02/she-
started-selling-abortion-pills-online-then-the-feds-showed-up/ [https://perma.cc/T6M
K-TCBD] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
357. See generally, The Plan C Report Card, PLAN C, https://plancpills.org/reportcard
[https://perma.cc/YDD6-4RJ5] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
358. See Conaboy, supra note 356.
359. See Imani Gandy, New York Woman Faces Up to Eight Years Behind Bars for Selling
Abortion Pills Online, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Aug. 9, 2019, 4:49 PM),
https://rewire.news/ablc/2019/08/09/new-york-woman-faces-up-to-eight-years-behind
-bars-for-selling-abortion-pills-online/ [https://perma.cc/H4KM-8356].
360. See id.; see also Kevin Murphy, Abortion-Drug Dealer Pleads Guilty, Linked to
Grand Rapids Man Accused of Poisoning Pregnant Woman's Drink, WIS. RAPIDS
TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/story/news/
2020/03/05/abortion-pill-dealer-ursula-wing-guilty-case-tied-grand-rapids-man/49664
88002/ [https://perma.cc/FC8R-YM48].
361. See Presser, supra note 38.
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women seeking abortions without the protection of medical licenses 
or doctor-patient privilege.362  Unlicensed practitioners have 
conducted research into medication abortion through web-based and 
web-assisted methods, network connections on social media, and 
online purchases.363  While this network’s safety depends on 
members remaining “anonymous and isolated,” their online activity 
places noisy digital trails that could make providers and their patients 
easily identifiable to law enforcement agencies.364  
If pregnant people do not have access to abortion clinics and health 
insurance, do not feel safe going to a clinic, and cannot obtain online 
prescriptions following a consultation with a licensed physician—
e.g., Dr. Gomperts—the only option left is purchasing misoprostol
and mifepristone online.365  One possible consequence of this trend is
the exposure of all providers and patients engaged in medication
abortion networks (licensed or not) and the online platforms they rely
on,366 to state and federal criminal investigations, or even
prosecutions related to conspiracy, mail fraud, and other charges
stemming from the sale, possession, or mailing of abortion
medications.367  As previously discussed, Texas advocates have
already pushed for a bill targeting providers mailing abortion pills
into the state.368  Some organizations servicing pregnant people have
taken their digital security very seriously and should continue to do
so for their staff and the people they serve.369
362. See id.
363. See Conaboy, supra note 356; see also Presser, supra note 38; see also infra note 364
and accompanying text (discussing the need for online providers to remain
anonymous and hidden).
364. See Presser, supra note 38.
365. See Claire Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, Why America's Abortion Rate Might
Be Higher than It Appears, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/09/20/upshot/abortion-pills-rising-use.html [https://perma.cc/PU2P-PKKZ].
366. See Trujillo supra note 210, at 642 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018) (“[A] law that
criminalize[s] interactive computer services that operate ‘with the intent to promote or
facilitate the prostitution of another person.’”)).
367. See Grand Jury Returns Indictments, supra note 355.
368. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  The proposed legislation introduced was
designed to make mailing abortion pills into Texas a felony.  María Méndez, As More
People Search for Abortion Pills Online, Texas Opponents Push to Restrict Access,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 2, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com
/news/politics/2019/12/02/as-more-people-search-for-abortion-pills-online-texas-oppo
nents-push-to-restrict-access/ [https://perma.cc/B66S-QRZ5].
369. See, e.g., Terms of Use and Privacy Policy, AID ACCESS, https://aidaccess.org/en/page
/510/terms-of-use-and-privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/6QXE-XLHN] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2020).
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2. Additional digital forensics techniques that could target providers.
In addition to the digital tracking that makes pregnant people
vulnerable, providers should also be aware of other digital forensic 
techniques historically used by law enforcement to surveil child 
pornography, prostitution, and other computer crimes.370  
Traditionally, image tracking by law enforcement has focused on 
the child sexual abuse image industry, but tracking software has been 
purchased by the Department of Homeland Security that could be 
used to track any type of image as it moves throughout the 
internet,371 whether the image includes a flyer with information about 
how to access abortion, a PDF file of the Anarchist’s Cookbook,372 or 
any other document that the government wants to tag by its hash-
value to trace.373  “Hash-value matching is a binary authentication 
method that can scan billions of digital communications in seconds 
for evidence of contraband.”374  Software systems like the Child 
Rescue Coalition375 database generate leads for law enforcement to 
follow by scanning exchanges of information for these hash-
values.376 
Prosecutors have relied on these systems to prosecute hundreds of 
people accused of distributing or possessing child pornography 
despite inconsistencies with the outcomes, for example, the images 
associated with an IP address were not found on the hard drive 
owned by the accused person.377 When faced with court orders to 
share access to these systems with defense teams, prosecutors prefer 
370. See generally Trujillo, supra note 210, at 625–49 (discussing various computer
crimes, law enforcement tactics used to combat the crimes, and issues concerning the
crimes).
371. United States v. Shipton, No. 18-cr-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928, at *7–8 (D.
Minn. Sept. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0202
(PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019).
372. See Denae Kassotis, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Technological Exceptionalism
After Carpenter: A Case Study on Hash-Value Matching, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1243, 1249–51 (2019).
373. See id.
374. Id. at 1243.
375. Our Work, CHILD RESCUE COAL., https://childrescuecoalition.org/our-work/ [https://
perma.cc/GQ9F-3CGV] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
376. United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-cr-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Sept. 11, 2019), aff'd, No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D.
Minn. Oct. 21, 2019).
377. Jack Gillum, Prosecutors Dropping Child Porn Charges After Software Tools Are
Questioned, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/prosecutors-dropping-child-porn-charges-after-software-tools-are-questioned
[https://perma.cc/KBW5-X89S].
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to drop the charges or accept a lesser plea, even with protective 
orders allowing access to attorneys and experts only.378  This system 
could be deployed to detect informational flyers about medication 
abortion, obtaining abortions across state lines, and other abortion 
options being distributed online through electronic communication or 
social media.379 
Another type of forensic technique used by law enforcement—
typically in the context of child pornography investigations—is 
known as the “honeypot.”380 
“A honeypot or deception host is a designated area within a 
computer system or network that has been designed 
specifically with the expectation that it will be attacked by 
unauthorized users, whether internal or external to the 
organization operating the honeypot.” 
. . . Honeypots are essentially passive decoys or copies of 
target websites. Honeypots provide law enforcement with 
the ability to capture “detailed and contemporaneous 
forensic evidence” about the bees that took the bait.381 
Once the bait has been taken, law enforcement can circumvent the 
need to subpoena IP addresses from a website or ISP under these 
circumstances as well by obtaining direct access to the IP 
addresses.382  In the abortion context, law enforcement could set up a 
fake abortion advocate website that collects IP addresses and other 
information aimed at charging people for taking steps towards getting 
an abortion or assisting someone in getting an abortion.383 
Websites hosting classified ads or otherwise facilitating in sex 
trafficking now face new criminal and civil liability, driving both 
consensual and coerced sex workers offline and back onto the streets 
378. See id.
379. See supra notes 371–78 and accompanying text.
380. Whitney J. Gregory, Comment, Honeypots: Not for Winnie the Pooh but for Winnie
the Pedo — Law Enforcement's Lawful Use of Technology to Catch Perpetrators and
Help Victims of Child Exploitation on the Dark Web, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259,
261 (2018).
381. Id. at 278–79 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan, Honeypots:
A Sticky Landscape?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH L.J. 317, 317-18 (2003)).
382. See id. at 283–88.
383. See id. at 278–79.
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to find customers.384  FOSTA/SESTA385 removes Section 230 
immunity,386 which previously protected platforms from liability for 
the content on their sites and as a result, many sex workers relying on 
web platforms to find clients were removed from Instagram, had their 
advertisements removed, and their PayPal accounts deactivated.387  
“Eliminating Section 230 immunity also restricts freedom of speech 
for consensual sex workers seeking safe work because ISPs that fear 
increased prosecution avoid liability by removing posting capabilities 
entirely.”388  Consequently, “FOSTA/SESTA has thus forced 
consensual sex workers to return to work on the streets absent any 
online platforms willing to host their advertisements.”389  Websites 
like YouTube and social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter 
have already censored organizations that provide online information 
about abortion.390  Conservatives in Congress could theoretically 
attempt to de-platform abortion providers with legislation similarly 
384. Data & Society Research Institute, Future Perfect Session 2: Voight-Kampff Tests,
YOUTUBE (July 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xlwaHHAvac&feature
=youtu.be.
385. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115–164, 132 Stat.1253 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A).
386. Data & Society Research Institute, supra note 384 (relevant discussion beginning at
31:00).
387. Id.; see also Heidi Tripp, Comment, All Sex Workers Deserve Protection: How
FOSTA/SESTA Overlooks Consensual Sex Workers in an Attempt to Protect Sex
Trafficking Victims, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 219, 235 (2019).
388. Tripp, supra note 387, at 234. 
389. Id.; see also Melissa Gira Grant, Broad Anti-Trafficking Law Faces its First
Constitutional Challenge, THE APPEAL (June 28, 2018), https://theappeal.org/broad-
anti-trafficking-law-faces-its-first-constitutional-challenge [https://perma.cc/HRD2-F
F6F] (discussing the lawsuit challenging constitutionality of SESTA/FOSTA).
390. On the Blocking of Abortion Rights Websites: Women on Waves & Women on Web,
OPEN OBSERVATORY OF NETWORK INTERFERENCE, https://ooni.org/post/2019-blocking
-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web [https://perma.cc/QUD6-SVL4] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2020) (“In May 2017, Women on Web tweeted that their Facebook
page was unpublished. Facebook reportedly censored the Women on Web page
(which helped women obtain abortion pills) citing its policy against the ‘promotion or
encouragement of drug use’. Their page though was only temporarily unpublished, as
Facebook restored access to it soon thereafter. This was not the first time that Women
on Web experienced censorship on Facebook. In January 2012, Facebook deleted an
image from the page of Dr. Rebecca Gomperts (the founder and director of Women
on Web) which consisted of text instructions on how to safely induce an abortion
using medication. In addition to Facebook censorship, Women on Web have
reportedly experienced censorship by Twitter and YouTube as well. In January 2015,
Twitter temporarily disabled the possibility to link to womenonweb.org or to tweet a
link to the website. In January 2018, YouTube temporarily removed the video
channels from Women on Waves and Women on Web, both of which contained
animations with information about safe ways to do an abortion with medicine.”).
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carving out exceptions to Section 230 immunity, although like 
FOSTA/SESTA would be subject to First Amendment challenges.391 
Finally, providers should be aware of all location-tracking 
surveillance available to law enforcement.392  That includes the cell 
phone towers discussed above,393 automatic license plate readers,394 
cell-site simulators,395 Bluetooth beacons,396 and EZ-Pass like 
devices.397  These devices could be used to track movements of 
specific people and to detect patterns of movement back and forth 
across state lines.398 
Understandably, continuing to engage with technology after 
researching and reading about all the new ways digital and 
surveillance devices track our thoughts and movements can be 
intimidating.399  Fortunately, there are movements to protect our data 
that we can connect with, members of various movements engaging 
with the challenges of surveillance technology, steps we can take to 
protect our privacy in our digital engagement, and litigation and 
391. See Marguerite A. O’Brien, Note, Free Speech or Slavery Profiteering?: Solutions for
Policing Online Sex-Trafficking Advertisement, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 289,
299–300 (2017).
392. See supra notes 20–21, 178 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
394. Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr [https://perma.cc/22K
Q-JXVZ] (Aug. 28, 2017).
 395. Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pag
es/cell-site-simulatorsimsi-catchers [https://perma.cc/CB6V-3J5B] (Aug. 28, 2017).
396. See Indoor Positioning, Tracking and Indoor Navigation with Beacons, INFSOFT,
https://www.infsoft.com/technology/positioning-technologies/bluetooth-low-energy-
beacons [https://perma.cc/7VL2-Z26X] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020); see Six Ways to
Use Bluetooth Beacons for People and Asset Tracking, TEAM SOFTWARE (Nov. 26,
2019), https://teamsoftware.com/blog/2019/11/26/six-ways-to-use-bluetooth-beacons-
for-people-and-asset-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/3625-D7KJ]; see Christopher
McFadden, Are You Being Tracked by Bluetooth Beacons While Shopping?,
INTERESTING ENG’G (June 20, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/are-you-being
-tracked-by-bluetooth-beacons-while-shopping [https://perma.cc/6KGM-VRFM].
397. Becky Akers, Congestion Pricing: The Road to the Surveillance State, FOUND. FOR
ECON. EDUC. (Jan. 1, 2008), https://fee.org/articles/congestion-pricing-the-road-to-
the-surveillance-state/ [https://perma.cc/B4WF-473U].
398. See Kareem Fahim et al., Cellphone Monitoring is Spreading with the Coronavirus.




399. See supra notes 392–98 and accompanying text.
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policy strategies we can deploy to control the damage our digital 
devices are capable of inflicting upon us.400 
IV. “POWER, NOT PARANOIA”401
This all feels overwhelming, and it is.  But there are organizing,
corporate accountability, legal, and policy strategies being developed 
with creativity, resilience, and research.402  There are other social 
justice movements, for example, in immigration and police 
surveillance spaces, that have woven digital privacy, data protection, 
and state surveillance into their community organizing work.403  Like 
these movements, the reproductive justice movement will also need 
to confront the challenges technology poses and create new 
protections for our communities to maintain their decisional-privacy 
around reproductive health in digital spaces and safely continue to 
rely on technology to access important information about abortion.404 
A. Organizing & Corporate Accountability.
“Power not paranoia” is a framework developed through the lens of
protecting communities in Los Angeles from police surveillance by 
the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition.405  The framework acknowledges 
“that the violence we live through does impact our mental health . . . 
because we are experiencing the impacts of a culture of fear and want 
to transform the impact.”406 Building on this framework, coalitions 
like the Our Data Bodies Project—which the Stop LAPD Spying 
Coalition is a part of—have developed out of historically oppressed 
communities organizing around digital data collection and human 
rights.407  Their research has resulted in tools like the Digital Defense 
Playbook408, community reports, and popular educational materials409 
400. See infra notes 402–03, 405 and accompanying text.
401. Kim M. Reynolds, Power Not Paranoia: An Oral History, OUR DATA BODIES
https://www.odbproject.org/2019/01/18/power-not-paranoia-an-oral-history/ [https://
perma.cc/3PNF-MWG6] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
402. See RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY 163, 166, 168, 171–72, 174–76,
184–85, 189 (2019) (ebook).
403. See id.
404. See infra notes 434–39, 453 and accompanying text.
405. Reynolds, supra note 401.
406. Id.
407. What We Are Doing, OUR DATA BODIES, https://www.odbproject.org/about/what-we-
are-doing/ [https://perma.cc/23GE-PTCW] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
408. SEETA PEÑA GANGADHARAN ET AL., DIGITAL DEFENSE PLAYBOOK: COMMUNITY 
POWER TOOLS FOR RECLAIMING DATA (2018), https://www.odbproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/ODB_DDP_HighRes_Single.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DJE-H
HMB].
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like six “Tips for Protecting Our Data.”410  These types of 
educational tools inform people about how to apply privacy settings 
on their devices to minimize their exposure to corporate and state 
surveillance.411 
Recent organizing efforts in criminal justice,412 immigration,413 
education,414 public health,415 and poverty movements416 have pushed 
back against the new opportunities for state intrusions created by 
technology.417  For example, the Community Justice Exchange 
collaborated with the Movement Alliance Project (MAP) to develop 
an organizer’s toolkit designed to help bail reform organizers push 
back against algorithm-based decision-making tools reliant upon data 
collected in the criminal justice system.418  When Philadelphia’s 
409. Tools, OUR DATA BODIES, odbproject.org/tools/ [https://perma.cc/GG43-Y4MX] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
410. Our Data Bodies Project, supra note 94.
411. See GANGADHARAN ET AL., supra note 408, at 35–37 (describing activity to educate
workshop participants about protecting their data trails).
412. See, e.g., Mapping Pretrial Injustice: A Community Driven Database, MAPPING
PRETRIAL RISK, pretrialrisk.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N946-
FLY5].
413. See, e.g., MIJENTE ET AL., TAKE BACK TECH: HOW TO EXPOSE AND FIGHT
SURVEILLANCE TECH IN YOUR CITY 2 (2019), https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/
2019/07/Tech-Policy-Report_v4LNX.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNL5-3NDA].
414. See, e.g., Carrie Pomeroy, How Community Members in Ramsey County Stopped a




415. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care,
THE VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/1714426
0/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/B2R4-4P
KU]; Legal Aid of Arkansas, Inc., Fighting the 4,000 Cuts: Tammy Dobbs,
FACEBOOK (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/arlegalaid/videos/143819497
6257716/.
416. See, e.g., Ryan Felton, Michigan Unemployment Agency Made 20,000 False Fraud
Accusations, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/dec/18/michigan-unemployment-agency-fraud-accusations [https://perma.
cc/6WK2-AX9W]; The SyRI Case: A Landmark Ruling for Benefits Claimants
Around the World, PRIV. INT'L (Feb. 24, 2020), https://privacyinternational.org/news-
analysis/3363/syri-case-landmark-ruling-benefits-claimants-around-world [https://per
ma.cc/VQ7Z-VQ65].
417. See infra notes 418–19 and accompanying text.
418. CMTY. JUST. EXCH., AN ORGANIZER'S GUIDE TO CONFRONTING PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN DECARCERATION CAMPAIGNS 2, 4 (2019), https://static1.square
space.com/static/5e1f966c45f53f254011b45a/t/5e35a639a96d977ad27f3ff0/15805742
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court system wanted to introduce risk assessment tools into their 
court process, MAP—along with a coalition of bail reform 
organizers—successfully stalled its approval and publicly organized 
against its use, even convincing the local prosecutor to oppose it.419  
Organizations like Just Futures Law and Mijente—a Latinx and 
Chicanx movement for “justice and self-determination for all 
people”—produced a joint report identifying the technology 
companies supporting Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE),420 created graphics explaining the networks,421 created 
petitions to companies like Amazon,422 organized walk-outs by tech 
workers,423 and protested under the rally cry (and hashtag) 
“#NoTechForICE”.424  Further, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a 
civil liberties organization, has facilitated a vast network of 
grassroots organizations across the country around technology 
issues.425  Its website hosts a vast amount of knowledge, training, 
web tools, and other resources for organizers, lawyers, and policy 
advocates working across multiple movements.426 One important 
68825/CJE_PretrialRATGuide_FinalDec2019Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/L79W-F 
UYK]. 
419. See Paige Gross, Pennsylvania’s Controversial Risk-Assessment Tool Was Just
Approved, TECHNICAL.LY PHILLY, https://technical.ly/philly/2019/09/06/pennsylvanias
-controversial-sentencing-risk-assessment-tool-was-just-approved/ [https://perma.cc/
Q78P-RU4H] (Sept. 9, 2019, 4:21 PM).
420. The J Is for Justice, MIJENTE, https://mijente.net/our-dna/ [https://perma.cc/DS9F-6E
AW] (emphasis added) (last visited Nov. 4, 2020); New Report Exposes Tech & Data
Companies Behind ICE, MIJENTE (Oct. 23, 2018), https://mijente.net/2018/10/whos-
behind-ice-the-tech-companies-fueling-deportations/ [https://perma.cc/ZKX3-BZCG]
(detailing joint report).
421. Mijente (@ConMijente), TWITTER (July 11, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com
/ConMijente/status/1149445902215630849 [https://perma.cc/8NPT-X9EV].
422. Tech Companies: Stop Powering ICE During Coronavirus!, #NOTECHFORICE,
https://notechforice.com/corona/ [https://perma.cc/QM3N-XBRN] (last visited Nov.
4, 2020).
423. See Lauren Kaori Gurley, Tech Workers Walked Off the Job After Software They
Made Was Sold to ICE, VICE (Oct. 31, 2019, 4:11 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_
us/article/43k8mp/tech-workers-walked-off-the-job-after-software-they-made-was-sol
d-to-ice [https://perma.cc/QJC9-3H7H].
424. Hannah Denham, ‘No Tech for ICE’: Protesters Demand Amazon Cut Ties with




425. See About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about [https://perma.cc
/34KT-99SP] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
426. See Our Work, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/updates [https://
perma.cc/FF25-28R6] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (listing available resources).
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consideration for digital security planning for pregnant people, 
abortion providers, and abortion assisters is that the amount of 
privacy protection we each should employ is not gauged by how 
exposed one is to criminal prosecution in a personal capacity, but by 
how exposed the most vulnerable person in our network is. 
Data for Black Lives (DBL) is another group of “activists, 
organizers, and mathematicians committed to the mission of using 
data science to create concrete and measurable change in the lives of 
Black people.”427  When parents and grassroots organizers in St. 
Paul, Minnesota wanted to stop a data collection and sharing 
agreement by the education and juvenile justice systems to flag “at-
risk” youth,  Data for Black Lives supported local organizers at an 
educational summit with a local group named the Coalition to Stop 
Cradle to Prison Algorithms.428  In addition to supporting local 
grassroots efforts to help them combat government arguments for 
data surveillance, Data for Black Lives also holds conferences to 
build bridges between grassroots organizational efforts and academic 
communities concerned about data.429  Other convenings, such as the 
Internet Freedom Festival430 and the Allied Media Conference431 also 
support networking across various movements impacted by new 
surveillance technology.432 
Many movements have had to confront the impact of technology in 
their fights for justice and some have even found allies in the 
technology space with whom they share organizing strategies and 
elevate efforts to conquer their communities’ struggles.433 
427. About Us, DATA FOR BLACK LIVES, https://d4bl.org/about.html [https://perma.cc
/RVM3-JGJA] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
428. See Pomeroy, supra note 414.
429. See Programs, DATA FOR BLACK LIVES, https://d4bl.org/programs.html [https://
perma.cc/EY8K-83XU] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020); see also Events, DATA FOR BLACK
LIVES, https://d4bl.org/events.html [https://perma.cc/XVW2-6BKQ] (last visited Nov.
4, 2020).
430. INTERNET FREEDOM FESTIVAL, https://internetfreedomfestival.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z
GN7-MBYC] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
431. About, ALLIED MEDIA PROJECTS, https://www.alliedmedia.org/about.story [https://per
ma.cc/H8YG-UR7D] (last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
432. See sources cited supra notes 430–31.
433. See generally Programs, supra note 429.
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B. Legal
There are both affirmative and defensive litigation strategies
potentially available.434  As discussed above, in addition to 
connecting with advocates like the National Advocates for Pregnant 
Women and If/When/How—who can frame legal strategies in the 
larger context of reproductive justice435 and organizers that can 
harness political pressure to dismiss charges436—defense attorneys 
should challenge the scope of digital searches by law enforcement by 
arguing they are Carpenter-like violations, whether they are done 
pursuant to a warrant or based on consent.437  ACLU’s Speech, 
Privacy, and Technology Project has been monitoring post-Carpenter 
decisions, submitting amicus briefs, and advocating for a broad 
interpretation of Carpenter’s protections.438  The National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has also initiated the 
Fourth Amendment Project, which entails consulting, co-counseling, 
and training defense attorneys about surveillance technology and 
other data-driven tools used in the criminal justice system.439  
Lawyers must also counsel clients about the risks of using their 
digital devices to communicate and search for information.440  There  
are many guides to digital privacy online, like those listed above,441 
that lawyers should make available to their clients while counseling 
them about their exposure if they have already used a digital 
device.442 
434. See generally About NAPW, NAT'L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, http://
advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/main/about_us/about_us.php [https://perma.cc/UD
34-PSD8] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
435. IF/WHEN/HOW: LAWYERING FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, https://ifwhenhow.org
[https://perma.cc/E64W-725X] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020); About NAPW, supra note
434.
436. See supra notes 2–11, 438–39 and accompanying text; see also Tell DA Scott Colom:
Drop the Charges Against Latice Fisher, COLOR OF CHANGE, https://act.colorofchange
.org/sign/no-charges-against-latice [https://perma.cc/KG7K-XTQT] (last visited Nov.
4, 2020) (organizing petitions to reduce Ms. Fisher's bail and pressure District
Attorney to drop charges).
437. For a detailed discussion of Carpenter, see supra Section III.A.4.i.
438. Nathan Freed Wessler, The Supreme Court's Most Consequential Ruling for Privacy
in the Digital Age, One Year In, ACLU (June 28, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/supreme-courts-most-
consequential-ruling-privacy-digital [https://perma.cc/Y7VQ-HAD9].
439. Fourth Amendment, NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/Land
ing/FourthAmendment [https://perma.cc/MG9D-GYEA] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
440. NACDLvideo, supra note 61.
441. See supra notes 408–09, 426 and accompanying text.
442. See generally Fourth Amendment, supra note 439.
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There may also be affirmative litigation opportunities in cities and 
states with privacy protections.443  States like Arizona and New 
Jersey, which have constitutional privacy protections,444 were joined 
in the digital era by states like California, discussed in more depth 
below,445 which enacted new privacy protections specifically 
designed to address new digital invasions.446  Additionally, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, Illinois, Washington, and New York have also 
introduced bills similar to California to authorize private rights of 
action against technology companies for privacy violations.447 
These new private right of action bills could give litigators more 
opportunities to fight for privacy protections for pregnant people 
seeking privacy in their decision-making regarding their reproductive 
health.448 
C. Policy
Attempts at regulating data sharing have begun at both federal and
state levels.449  In 2018, California passed the strongest privacy 
legislation.450  The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 gives 
443. Libbie Canter et al., State Legislatures Are Off to the Privacy Races, with New
Hampshire in the Lead, COVINGTON (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.insideprivacy.com/c
cpa/state-legislatures-are-off-to-the-privacy-races-with-new-hampshire-in-the-lead/
[https://perma.cc/LZT4-PQXX].
444. State v. Mixton, 447 P.3d 829, 842–43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (holding under Arizona
state constitution protection of “private affairs;” “internet users generally have an
expectation of privacy in their subscriber information. . . . Warrantless government
collection of this information from an internet service provider or similar source thus
constitutes a significant and unwarranted intrusion into a person's private affairs—an
intrusion our constitution unambiguously prohibits.”); State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33
(N.J. 2008) (affirming suppression under state constitution for warrantless request to
ISP for IP address subscriber information).
445. See infra notes 446–51 and accompanying text.
446. Jill Cowan & Natasha Singer, How California's New Privacy Law Affects You, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3. 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/ccpa-california-
privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/3C4V-R4MG].
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consumers the right to know what personal information (“PI”) is 
being collected about them and whether their PI is being sold and to 
whom; the right to access their PI; the right to delete PI collected 
from them; the right to opt-out or opt-in to the sale of their PI, 
depending on the age of the consumer; and the right to equal service 
and price, even if they exercise such rights.451  As discussed above, 
state constitutional privacy provisions in Arizona, New Jersey, and 
other states can protect people accused of crimes based on digital 
device evidence, even when federal third-party doctrine does not.452  
New laws have also been enacted at the state and city levels to 
protect individuals’ personal information gathered from biometric 
data.453  
At the federal level, the Online Privacy Act “would create a new 
federal agency, the Digital Privacy Agency, to enforce privacy 
rights.”454  Another bill, the Algorithmic Accountability Act, would 
enable the Federal Trade Commission to conduct investigations into 
data protections for data used by algorithms in the public sector.455  
Facial recognition technology and the data those systems collect from 
our faces is also a target of pending legislation.456  One weakness 
many of these laws share, however, is broad carve-outs for “public 
safety” or, in other words, law enforcement.457  None of the new 
digital privacy legislation would heighten the standard for what a 
policy/2018/06/california-approves-privacy-rules-opposed-by-isps-and-tech-compani 
es/ [https://perma.cc/33KJ-M6J4]. 
451. Id.; Cowan & Singer, supra note 446; Today’s Law as Amended, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.
(Nov. 08, 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill
_id=201720180AB375&showamends=false# [https://perma.cc/FNX6-K5LS].
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Oakland, California, and Somerville, Massachusetts have all enacted facial
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Technology in the US, VOX (Aug. 9, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com
/recode/2019/8/9/20799022/facial-recognition-law [https://perma.cc/AZ22-NXNS].
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ps://perma.cc/6W4E-9LLE].
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456. See Ghaffary, supra note 453.
457. See, e.g., N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE: USE OF DEPARTMENT UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) (2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/
pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf#page=687 [https://perma.cc/6WEL-853U]
(detailing carve-outs under Section 212-124).
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prosecutor or sheriff would need to present to obtain the search 
history for a woman suspected of terminating her own pregnancy.458   
Other policy recommendations include limiting data retention and 
use from health-related websites459 similar to prohibitions in Article 9 
of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which 
protects “data concerning health or data concerning a natural 
person’s sex life or sexual orientation[.]”460  This type of regulation 
may protect reproductive health data more consistently than digital 
privacy laws with public safety exceptions.461 
There are also new regulations that may compromise Americans’ 
digital privacy related to their medical records.462  A new federal rule 
requires health providers to share medical information with third-
party apps (e.g., Apple’s Health Records with patient authorization) 
but offers no protection from the health records shared with those 
companies from being further transferred to insurance companies, 
employers, or law enforcement.463  Legislation has also been 
introduced to require private companies that sell tools to the public 
sector for use in the criminal justice system to share their source code 
and other information about how systems are created with defense 
attorneys.464 
458. See generally Eric Litke, Fact Check: Did Senators Vote to Allow Access to Web
History? Only for Counterterrorism, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/factcheck/2020/05/21/fact-check-senate-didnt-ok-warrantless-access-internet-
history/5236880002 [https://perma.cc/K3K8-4PQA] (May 27, 2020, 4:18 PM)
(discussing the Senate's vote to allow federal agencies access to search history
without a warrant).  The policy recommendation by Upturn to ban consent searches
on digital devices, in contrast, would have prevented Ms. Fisher’s digital device from
being confiscated and analyzed without a judicial warrant.  See KOEPKE ET AL., supra
note 148, at 59–61.
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LIBERT (Mar. 2015), https://timlibert.me/pdf/Libert-2015-Health_Privacy_on_Web
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L69Q-A9JL].
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461. See id.
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Some policy recommendations are aimed at technology companies 
directly, encouraging them to set the highest level of privacy as 
defaults and encouraging engineers to figure out ways to filter data 
that has medically sensitive information and prevent its 
redistribution.465  Search engines have also taken steps to deter the 
large volume of law enforcement search history requests by 
proposing to charge per request.466 
Problematically, it is not clear that even these much needed 
solutions would address the broad power that the government has to 
administratively subpoena information from these search engines.467  
That is not a reason to despair, but a reason to organize and 
incorporate these very real concerns into new legislation limiting 
what police and prosecutors can access from third parties about 
medically relevant information collected by digital devices.468 
CONCLUSION 
Controlling pregnant people’s bodies and decisions about their 
pregnancy have long been the goal of many people in power.469  
Never before have they had such a strong arsenal of surveillance 
tools with which to do it.470  Whether it is being able to peer into our 
digital diaries—by seizing digital devices and search histories, 
tracking physical movements, or identifying people through 
biometrics—the amount of digital, biometric, and genetic data 
tracking the government is currently capable of changes the nature of 
every conversation about social justice, especially in an era lurching 
backwards towards criminalizing pregnancy outcomes.471 
These new unregulated technological developments, in 
combination with the potential increase in the criminalization of 
pregnancy and abortion, will create life-long devastating penalties for 
people seeking autonomy over their decisions related to their 
reproductive health.472  As we strategize solutions for new versions 
of old problems presented by surveillance technology, we must 
465. See Libert, supra note 459, at 75.
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nevertheless maintain the fundamental goals of deconstructing 
racism, misogyny, and patriarchy.473 
473. See supra Part I.
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